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Several years ago, I mediated two personal injury insurance claims on
the same day.1 In the first case, the clients participated along with their
lawyers; in the second, they did not. The clients' presence made for vast
differences in the content and style of the mediation and in my own
experience.
The first case involved an automobile accident in which the victim (I
will call her "Alice May") suffered serious injuries and her automobile
sustained great damage. Ms. May sat beside her lawyer. For the de-
fense, the claims adjuster (I will call her "Grace Green") assumed the
client role,2 and a local attorney hired by the insurance company repre-
sented the insured.
The room crackled with emotion as we discussed the case. In earlier
negotiations Grace Green had demanded documentation of Ms. May's
damage claims. Alice May was hurt and angry because she felt that
Grace Green had "called [her] a liar." Ms. Green also was entangled
emotionally. She feared being duped, and although she did not express
this until late in the session, she did not want Alice to dislike her.
A highly charged exchange between the clients consumed a major por-
1. Mediation is a voluntary process in which a neutral third party helps others resolve a dis-
pute or plan a transaction, ordinarily by facilitating negotiations between the participants. Unlike a
judge or arbitrator, a mediator lacks authority to decide the case. See LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES
E. WESTBROOK, DIsPuTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 196-249 (1987).
2. I say "client role" because the claims adjuster was not a party to the underlying dispute in
the same sense as was the insured.
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tion of the mediation; raw feelings spilled over the mahogany conference
table. The clients' conduct in the mediation, and their comments after-
ward, suggest that this conversation was essential to the settlement.
Each client felt she had earned the other's respect, and each seemed to
think that achieving this kind of "balance" was valuable in itself. More-
over, participation helped them conclude that the resulting monetary
agreement was fair. Stated simply, the presence and direct participation
of both clients focused attention on the parties' relationship. Achieving
mutual respect became an important goal of the mediation.
The clients' conversation could not have taken place unless lawyers
and the mediator-the "professionals"-allowed it. During this conver-
sation, the professionals did almost nothing, and I felt extremely tense
and uncertain about my role. I had relinquished control, and had little
idea where the conversation would lead. Worse, I was a professional
mediator and a lawyer; I was being paid for this. Surely there was some-
thing I should do. I think the lawyers may have had similar reactions.
The second mediation arose out of a claim of police brutality in con-
nection with an allegedly invalid arrest. Only lawyers attended.3 The
defendant's lawyer, a local practitioner, had been hired by the defend-
ant's out-of-state insurance company.
This session felt drastically different from the other. Although the
claimant alleged intentional, racially motivated, abusive police conduct,
the session was entirely cordial. Each participant wore a "professional
mask,"4 which limited the personal aspects of our involvement. A
clubby cordiality replaced the tension and uncertainty of the other medi-
ation, and this polite interaction continued even after it became clear that
settlement was impossible.
As it turned out, the mediation was premature; the insurance company
had authorized its lawyer to settle only for nuisance value because she
had not had time to take certain depositions. We all realized that the
culprit was the claims adjuster, who had insisted that his lawyer try me-
diation even though he was not ready make a significant offer.5
3. The plaintiff's lawyer said that the organization that arranged the mediation informed him
that his client's presence was not necessary. The normal practice of that organization is to en-
courage the plaintiff, but not the defendant, to attend personally.
4. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & JAMES R. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A
NUTSHELL 46 (1987).
5. If he had been scheduled to attend the mediation personally, I imagine he would have
postponed it until he was ready to talk.
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Although the plaintiff's lawyer was enormously upset at wasting half a
day at this mediation, he contained his emotion. The other lawyer and I
validated his feelings, and the three of us went on to discuss legal educa-
tion, mutual friends, and the like.
As I drove to my office after these two mediations, I was startled to
realize that, on that day at least, I was much more comfortable without
the clients.6  The events of that day have nagged at my conscience. As
a mediator I had no authority to compel the parties themselves to attend.
I normally encouraged them to do so, however, because I believed that
client attendance usually brings quicker, more satisfying settlements for
the client. What stunned me was the realization that I sometimes hope
that the clients will not show up, because I will have an easier time medi-
ating without them. If I had the power to compel the parties to attend
these mediation sessions, I wondered, when, why, and how would I use
it?
This question prompted my interest in G. Heileman Brewing Co. v.
Joseph Oat Corp. I The relevant part of G. Heileman Brewing Co. began
in 1984, when a U.S. magistrate in Madison, Wisconsin issued an order
that befuddled some of the parties and their lawyers and, on appeal,
sharply divided the judges on the Seventh Circuit. The magistrate di-
rected each party and their insurance carriers to send to a settlement
conference, in addition to their lawyers, "a representative having full au-
thority to settle the case or to make decisions and grant authority to
counsel with respect to all matters that may be reasonably anticipated to
come before the conference."' National Union Fire Insurance Company
of Pittsburgh, the carrier for defendant Joseph Oat Corporation, sent no
representative to the key conference. Joseph Oat Corporation, however,
did send a representative along with the lawyer the insurance company
retained to defend it. The representative was a lawyer, a member of the
law firm that generally represented the corporation. He indicated that he
had authority to state the position of the corporation: it would make no
offer because it believed that if any offer were to be made the insurance
6. I do not assert that the presence or absence of clients ordinarily will correlate with the kinds
of events that occurred in these two cases. For further discussion of these two cases, see infra notes
151-52, 162, and accompanying text.
For discussions of the use of stories in legal writing, see Symposium, Pedagogy of Narrative, 40 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1990).
7. 107 F.R.D. 275 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (Heileman 1), aff'd, 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en
banc).
8. 107 F.R.D. at 279.
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carrier was obligated to make it. Interpreting this as a violation of his
order, the magistrate sanctioned Joseph Oat Corporation and National,
requiring them to pay the expenses, including attorneys' fees, the other
litigants incurred in attending the conference.9
The chief judge of the district court declined to reconsider the order,10
but a divided three judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed. 1  The full court subsequently withdrew the
panel's opinion and upheld the magistrate's order, concluding that a dis-
trict court, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 and the court's
inherent authority, may order a represented litigant to attend a settle-
ment conference along with his lawyer, and that the magistrate did not
abuse his discretion by ordering Oat to send a representative armed with
"full authority to settle the case" or by imposing sanctions on the parties
that failed to comply with that order.12 The six to five vote included five
dissenting opinions. 3
I will not quarrel with either the majority or the dissenters. 4 The
9. Id. at 282-83.
10. Id. at 277.
11. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 848 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1988) (Heileman
12. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 656-57 (7th Cir. 1989) (en
bane) (Heileman III).
13. Three of the dissenting judges concluded that neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16
nor their inherent authority authorized district courts to order a represented client to attend a settle-
ment conference. Id. at 658 (Coffey, J., dissenting); id. at 666 (Manion, J., dissenting); id. at 665
(Ripple, J., dissenting). The other two took no position on whether the court had such authority,
but argued that, if such authority existed, the magistrate had abused it in this case. Id. at 657
(Posner, J., dissenting); id. at 663 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
14. The case has attracted great attention in the literature. See, eg., A United States District
Court Judge Can Order Litigants, Even Those Represented by Counsel, to Appear Before the Court in
Person for a Pretrial Conference, 1989 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 104; Paul Reidinger, Then It's Settled;
7th Circuit Upholds Rule 16 Order, 75 A.B.A. J., July 1989, at 92; David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule
16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1989 (1990); Farol
Parco, Note, Strandell v. Jackson County and G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.: The
Fadure of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to Narrow the Interpretation of Rule 16 and Limit the
Inherent Power Doctrine, 4 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 157 (1990); Tony J. Masciopinto, Note, Expanding
Rule 16's Scope to Compel Represented Parties with Full Settlement Authority to Attend Pretrial
Conferences, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 931 (1990); Bradley Adas, Note, The Seventh Circuit Approves the
Exercise of Inherent Authority to Increase a District Judge's Pre-Trial Authority Under Rule 16, 23 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 517 (1990); Susan Kaye Antalovich, Note, Defining the Perimeters of Judicial
Involvement in the Settlement Process, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 115 (1989); Robert J. Keenan,
Note, Rule 16 and Pretrial Conferences: Have We Forgotten the Most Important Ingredient?, 63 So.
CAL. L. REV. 1449 (1990); Eric D. Bender, Note, So It's Settled, Then-Rule 16 and Courts' Power
to Order Represented Parties to Attend Pretrial Settlement Conferences, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1421
(1990).
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majority's conclusion that federal courts have authority to order repre-
sented clients to attend a settlement conference was as supportable, based
on "narrowly 'legal' considerations," as the contrary conclusion reached
in three of the dissenting opinions. 5 In any event, the majority's conclu-
sion now seems firmly entrenched, especially in light of the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990.16 That statute, signed by President Bush on De-
cember 1, 1990, requires every federal district court to develop a "Civil
Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan"1 7 and provides that such
plan may require that "upon notice by the court, representatives of the
parties with authority to bind them in settlement discussion be present or
available by telephone during any settlement conference.""'
What interests me, then, is not whether the federal courts have this
authority, but when, why, and how they should use it. This question is
enormously important. Federal courts are experimenting with alterna-
tive dispute resolution at dizzying rates, and new legislation makes in-
creased usage likely.19 The Heileman decision, along with the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, is likely to encourage judges to compel cli-
15. Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting) (The narrowly "legal" considerations
are equivocal).
i6. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
17. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5090, (1990) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 471).
18. Id. at 5093 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(5)) (emphasis added).
19. Congress recently has boosted a long-developing trend toward alternative dispute resolution
in the federal district courts. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, supra note 16, establishes that
the Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan that each federal district court develops may
provide that in complex cases a judicial officer explore the possibility of settlement, id. at 5092 (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(3)(A)), and may also provide "authorization to refer appropriate cases
to alternative dispute resolution programs that (A) have been designated for use in a district court;
or (B) the court may make available, including mediation, minitrial, and summary jury trial." Id.
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6)).
Congress based this legislation on recommendations in a recent report by the Federal Courts
Study Committee that suggested broadening of federal courts' authority to implement alternative
dispute resolution programs and funding of "sustained experimentation" with such mechanisms.
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 81-87 (1990).
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990), requires
federal government agencies to develop a policy addressing the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution.
A Brookings Institution task force has recommended that backlogged courts experiment with
"settlement weeks." BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY
IN CIVIL LITIGATION 29 (1989).
A committee of the Conference of State Court Administrators has recommended that courts ex-
plore the use of alternative processes organized to permit appropriate court supervision and evalua-
tion, and designed and managed to promote faster, less expensive, and better dispute resolution
methods. CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS COMMITTEE ON ALTERNATIVE Dis-
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ents and representatives of organizational litigants armed with settlement
authority20 to attend settlement conferences, along with their lawyers.21
This practice offers vast possibilities for achieving quicker and sometimes
better settlements. It carries equally vast risks. The academic and prac-
tice literature, however, has paid remarkably little attention to the ques-
tions of when and how to involve clients in such conferences. None of
the Heileman opinions offers any affirmative guidance. Nor do they
elaborate sufficiently on the attributes required of the corporate represen-
tative with "full authority to settle."
My aim in this Article is to provide background, along with some
modest suggestions, that could assist judges, lawyers, and clients in deter-
mining when and how clients should participate in settlement
discussions.
Part I begins with a history of the case. It then sets out various per-
spectives that litigants, lawyers and judges commonly bring to settlement
conferences, perspectives on lawyer-client relations, negotiation, and the
role of the judicial host. Next, it examines the opinions in the Heileman
case, along with other materials, in an attempt to uncover the underlying
assumptions about the settlement conference that informed the behavior
of the judges and lawyers in that case. I argue that Heileman's explana-
tion lies in the lawyers' and judges' tendency to embrace one of two radi-
cally different visions of the settlement conference.
Part II catalogs the advantages and disadvantages of involving clients
PUTE RESOLUTION, REPORT TO THE MEMBERSHIP 2 (1990). This approach also is reflected in the
American Bar Association Standards Relating to Court Organization § 1.12.5 (1990).
20. Unless otherwsise noted, discussions of client participation include situations in which orga-
nizational litigants authorize individuals other than their attorneys of record to represent them in
settlement talks.
21. Current practices on compelling represented clients to attend settlement conferences vary
widdy. While in some courts the practice is institutionalized (see, e.g., infra note 180), other courts
routinely exclude clients. E. Allen Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder. Tort Litigants' Evalua-
tions of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. & Soc'y REv. 953, 963 (1990).
Only nine percent of the litigants in a sample of the settlement conferences in the Seventh Circuit
Court in Prince George's County, Maryland attended the settlement conferences. E. ALLAN LIND
ET1 AL., TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SET-
rLEMENT CONFERENCES (Rand Inst. For Civ. Just. No. 12-3708-iCJ, 1989). In the three courts
studied, litigants who personally attended the settlement conferences tended to perceive the settle-
mcnt conferences as more dignified than those who did not, leading the authors to conclude that
liigants form impressions of dispute resolution procedures even if they do not participate. Id.
Almost 80% of Second Circuit federal judges responding to a survey indicated that they "occa-
sionally or never" required a client to attend a settlement conference. STANDING COMMITTEE ON
IMPROVEMENT OF CIVIL LITIGATION, SETrLEMENT PRACTICES IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 16
(IlS).
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in settlement conferences and describes the many different ways in which
a client can participate. In addition, Part II includes some general sug-
gestions about when and for what purposes a judicial host should require
a litigant or a representative of an organizational litigant to accompany
the litigant's lawyer to a settlement conference. It then proposes an ex-
planation for the expression "full authority to settle the case" as it ap-
plies to an organization. Finally, Part II reviews the obligations of the
client or client representative once he or she appears at the settlement
conference. Part III sums up and suggests a special benefit flowing from
client participation in settlement conferences.
I. A HISTORY OF THE CASE WITH EMPHASIS ON THE PERSPECTIVES
OF THE PARTICIPANTS
A bit of background will put the case into legal perspective. Rule 16 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives the court discretion to "direct
the attorney for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear
before it for a conference ... before trial" for such purposes as facilitat-
ing or discussing settlement and allows the court to impose sanctions for
failure "to participate in good faith."22
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5), (c)(7) (emphasis added).
(a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any action, the court may in its discretion direct
the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a confer-
ence or conferences before trial for such purposes as...
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case.
(c) Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences. The participants at any conference
under this rule may consider and take action with respect to...
(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the
dispute;
(f) Sanctions. If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, or
if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, or if a
party or party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the judge, upon motion or the
judge's own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto as are just.... In lieu of
or in addition to any other sanction, the judge shall require the party or the attorney repre-
senting the party or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncom-
pliance with this rule, including attorney's fees, unless the judge finds that the
noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.
FED. R. CIv. P. 16 (emphasis added). Some state courts have relatively clear guidance on this issue.
A Florida statute provides:
(1) In any action for damages based on personal injury or wrongful death arising out of
medical malpractice, whether in tort or contract, the court shall require a settlement con-
ference at least 3 weeks before the date set for trial;
(2) Attorneys who will conduct the trial, parties, and persons with authority to settle
shall attend the settlement conference held before the court unless excused by the court for
good cause.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.108 (West. Supp. 1991).
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At the time the magistrate issued the disputed settlement conference
order in Heileman, it was plain that Rule 16(c)(7), which was added to
include settlement discussions among the purposes of pretrial confer-
ences, did not change prior law, which prohibited sanctions for failure to
accept a settlement proposal.23 In addition, several cases had dealt with
the authority Rule 16 granted to a federal district court to compel liti-
gants to take part in activities explicitly aimed at fostering settlement.
None of these, however, had confronted the precise issue addressed in
Heileman: whether federal district courts have authority to compel a
represented litigant, or a representative of an organizational litigant
armed with full settlement authority, to attend a settlement conference
along with the litigant's lawyer.24
Two courts, though, addressed a similar question and held that a fed-
eral district court may compel attendance of a representative of a party's
insurance carrier at a settlement conference.25  However, in these cases
the persons who violated the court's orders did so deliberately. In Heile-
23. Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1985).
24. Federal courts had disagreed about a district court's authority to compel parties to partici-
pate in a summary jury trial, a process in which lawyers make abbreviated presentations of their
cases to a "jury" that renders a nonbinding verdict. See Thomas D. Lambros, A Summary Jury Trial
Primer, in DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON & IRVINE ADR PRACTICE BOOK 373 (J. Wilkinson ed.,
1999). In Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988), the court held that Rule 16(c)
does not authorize a federal district court to require an unwilling litigant to participate in a summary
jury trial, maintaining that the Rule authorizes only discussion of alternatives at pretrial conferences
and voluntary participation in any alternative agreed upon. Two federal district courts in other
circuits have held to the contrary, finding that Rule 16 provides authority to compel participation in
a summary jury trial. Arabian-American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988);
McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
Several opinions had affirmed the authority of a district court to require litigants to participate in
nonbinding court-annexed arbitration. In this process, the attorneys present their cases in an abbre-
viated fashion to arbitrators. The arbitrators' decision becomes the judgment of the court unless a
party requests a trial de novo. Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Gilling
v Eastern Airlines, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 169 (D.N.J. 1988). Clients ordinarily choose to attend sum-
mary jury trial and court-annexed arbitration proceedings, but are not required to do so.
Today, a federal court's authority to order litigants into alternative dispute resolution seems con-
siderably clearer as a result of the Civil Justice Improvement Act of 1990. See supra notes 17-18 and
accompanying text.
25. The Sixth Circuit decided In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1974), before the Heile-
man orders were issued. In Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44 (E.D. Ky. 1987), the court's order
came after and relied on the district court's decision in Heileman, but before Heileman reached the
court of appeals.
A recent 11th Circuit decision is grounded on a different understanding of Rule 16 and the courts'
inherent authority. In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397 (1 lth Cir. 1991) arose out of a medical malpractice
claim. The district court ordered Novak, an employee of CNA, the defendant's insurer, to attend a
settlement conference (after the court had been advised by defense counsel that Novak had full
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man, the Oat Corporation maintained that it thought it was complying
with the court's order.
A. The Dispute
In 1980, G. Heileman Brewing Company ("Heileman") of LaCrosse,
Wisconsin signed an agreement with a local engineering firm, RME As-
sociates ("RME"), which, it hoped, would solve its long-standing waste
water treatment problems. The agreement called for RME to install a
waste water treatment system that had been developed by a Dutch firm,
Centrale Suicker Maatschappij ("CSM"). The Joseph Oat Corporation
of Camden, New Jersey ("Oat") held an exclusive license to distribute
the system in the United States. RME subcontracted with Oat to supply
the waste treatment system. Oat was insured by the National Fire Insur-
ance Company of Pittsburgh. The relationships are depicted below.
RME Contract Heileman
Subcontract
Oat
Insured By I License
National CSM
Heileman's hopes were dashed when the system failed to function as
well as had the pilot system. A dispute arose concerning the quality of
settlement authority). Novak refused to attend, having concluded that the court's order was invalid.
The district court found him in criminal contempt.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, citing neither In re Lamarre nor Lockhart v. Patel, agreed that the
order was invalid; it concluded that neither Rule 16 nor the court's inherent authority provided a
basis for a court to order a representative of a nonparty insurance carrier with full settlement author-
ity to attend a settlement conference. The court followed Heileman MII in recognizing that the court
had inherent authority to order such attendance by a representative of a party, but it differed from
Heileman III in stating that Rule 16 provided no such authority. In the view of the court of appeals,
in order to secure the participation of a nonparty insurance company representative with full settle-
ment authority, the District Court should order theparty to produce a representative with full settle-
ment authority.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals affirmed the finding of criminal contempt because Novak had
failed to follow the appropriate procedure for challenging the court's order.
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the water that Heileman ran through the system. CSM apparently had
designed the system to remove certain elements that deplete water of free
oxygen. The designers never intended that the system screen out large
objects such as bottle caps and broken bottles, which were in the water
Heileman ran through the system. In addition, the system inexplicably
generated a noxious odor.2 6
Heileman incurred extra expenses to make the system work as
required and withheld some payments that RME expected under the
contract. RME in turn refused to make certain payments set forth in its
contract with Oat. A flurry of state and federal lawsuits resulted.27
After various dismissals and settlements, two lawsuits remained
unresolved: Heileman's state court suit against RME and CSM, and, the
case that gave rise to the events discussed in this Article, RME's action
in federal court against Oat and CSM. Thus, the settlement conferences
described in this Article concerned only the claims of RME against
Joseph Oat Corporation and CSM.2"
On November 7, 1984, RME filed a motion to postpone the trial,
scheduled for January 14, 1985, to permit the parties to continue
settlement efforts begun in the state court case. The magistrate granted
the motion and verbally ordered a settlement conference for December
14, 1984. The order, reduced to writing on November 19, 1984, stated,
inter alia, that "[iln addition to counsel, each party shall be represented
at the conference by a representative having full authority to settle the
case, excepting only CSM, whose authorized representative in the
Netherlands shall be available by telephone throughout the duration of
26. I pieced this together from reading the opinions as well as from telephone interviews with
attorneys representing various parties in this case. Telephone Interview with John Possi, Esq.,
counsel for Joseph Oat Corporation, retained by National (April 19, 1989); Telephone Interview
with John Fitzpatrick, Esq., counsel for Joseph Oat Corporation at the key conference (April 19,
1981); Telephone Interview with Richard Florsheim and Thomas L. Shriner, counsel for G.
Heileman Brewing Co. (April 18,1989).
27. Oat brought an action against Heileman and RME in federal district court in New Jersey,
and RME counterclaimed. The case was transferred to the Western District of Wisconsin; RME
joined CSM as a third-party defendant. Heileman next commenced action in a state court against
Oat and RME, in response to which RME cross-claimed against Oat, counterclaimed against
Heileman, and later joined CSM. At an early stage, Heileman and Oat settled and withdrew all
claims against each other; the district court dismissed Heileman. Subsequently, Oat dismissed its
claim against RME in the federal court. The remaining federal proceedings were RME's claims
against Oat and CSM. Also, Heileman still maintained its state court action against RME.
Heileman II, 848 F.2d at 1417-19.
28. Hcileman 1, 107 F.R.D. at 277. Subsequently, RME and CSM settled with each other.
Heileman intervened in the case and was substituted for RME against Oat. Id. at 277 n.l.
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the conference."29
RME and CSM complied with this order, sending both principals and
attorneys.3" The problems concerned Joseph Oat Corporation and its
insurer, National Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh. Both John
Possi, an attorney National hired to represent Oat, and John Fitzpatrick,
Oat's personal attorney, interpreted the language quoted above to require
the presence of a representative of Oat's insurance company, not a
representative of the corporation itself.31 Accordingly, only John Possi
appeared as counsel for Oat, and Possi had no settlement authority.
Joseph McMahon, an independent adjuster, represented National.32 He
maintained that National "was not interested in making any payment."
33
From that point on, the magistrate had no further discussions with
McMahon or Possi. 34
29. Id. at 278. Though not subject to the court's jurisdiction, G. Heileman Brewing Co. was
represented at the conference by its attorney, Richard Florsheim, and its general counsel, a Mr.
Smith. Id. at 278.
30. Id.
31. John M. Fitzpatrick stated:
I did not read this as requiring the presence of a principal of Joseph Oat Corp. at the
conference scheduled for December 14, 1984 at 2 p.m. I read that requirement as referring
to a representative of the insurance carrier with authority to discuss settlement of this
matter, and in my conversations with Mr. Kaplan of the Joseph Oat Corp. conveyed to
him my interpretation of that portion of the Order and advised him that it was not
necessary for anyone from Joseph Oat to appear at that conference.
Both Mr. Kaplan and I at the time of this conversation believed that Oat's insurance
company would appear at the conference with authority to discuss the possibility of
settlement. It was decided at that time between Mr. Kaplan and myself that I would
attend the conference for the sole purpose of urging the insurance company to enter into
serious negotiations and to protect Oat's interest.
Affidavit of John M. Fitzpatrick, Esq. in Opposition to the Imposition of Sanctions Against Joseph
Oat Corp. at 1-2, G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 107 F.R.D. 275 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
Later, according to the affidavit, Fitzpatrick learned from McMahon, National's adjustor, that he
had not received authority from National to make an offer at the conference. At that point, Fitzpat-
rick concluded there would be no purpose in his traveling to Madison for the conference. Kaplan
concurred, and Fitzpatrick did not attend. Id. at 3.
32. The magistrate referred to Mr. McMahon as an independent adjuster. Heileman I, 107
F.R.D. at 279. The attorney for Oat Corporation has taken issue with this characterization, stating
that McMahon worked for the American International Adjustment Company, which was a wholly
owned subsidiary of American International, as was National. In other words, McMahon reported
"regularly to claims managers for National Union." Letter to the author from John Possi (Feb. 1,
1991).
33. Heileman 1, 107 F.R.D. at 279.
34. John Possi explained in an interview that the settlement conference consisted primarily of a
series of private meetings between the magistrate, the parties, and their representatives. After the
conversation between the magistrate, Possi, and McMahon, the magistrate asked them to wait in the
hall. He then held meetings with other parties and did not meet again privately with Possi or
McMahon. Telephone Interview with John Possi, counsel for Joseph Oat Corp. (Apr. 19, 1989).
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At the conclusion of this conference, Magistrate Groh entered an
oral order, in the presence of all parties, continuing the conference until
December 19, 1984. The order, as reduced to writing on December 18,
1984, stated that the absence of duly authorized corporate
representatives "impaired" progress of the earlier conference. It
provided:
In addition to counsel, each party and the insurance carriers of plaintiff
Oat and defendant RME, shall be represented at the conference in person
by a representative having full authority to settle the case or to make deci-
sions and grant authority to counsel with respect to all matters that may be
reasonably anticipated to come before the conference.35
Still, the attorneys for Joseph Oat apparently had trouble understand-
ing the magistrate's command. About December 17, John Possi tele-
phoned the magistrate's clerk, explained that Oat was not in a position to
make a settlement offer, and asked for confirmation of the magistrate's
intent. According to Possi, the clerk told him, "'The magistrate stands
by his order. He expects someone from Oat to be there.' "36 Possi then
called Fitzpatrick, Oat's outside counsel for the matter, and told him that
the magistrate wanted Fitzpatrick or one of the principals of Oat to at-
tend the December 19 conference.3 7 Fitzpatrick then contacted McMa-
hon, National's independent claims adjuster. McMahon told him that he
would not attend the December 19 conference because he had received
no authority to make an offer. Furthermore, according to Fitzpatrick,
McMahon indicated for the first time that National might "deny cover-
age and attempt to avoid its obligation to defend in this litigation and
might file an action for declaratory judgment."3 " After Fitzpatrick dis-
cussed this development with Maurice Holtz, Vice President of Oat, the
two agreed that Fitzpatrick should attend the conference and "convey to
the Court Joseph Oat's position that they will not at this time make an
offer to settle the case." 3 9
Fitzpatrick appeared at the December 19 conference. National's
claims adjuster was not present. Attorney John Possi appeared for Oat;
he said he did not represent National but that National had told him that
it believed it was not subject to the order in question because it was not a
35. Heileman I, 107 F.R.D. at 279.
36. Affidavit of John C. Possi, Esq., G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 107 F.R.D.
275 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
37. See Fitzpatrick Affidavit, supra note 31, at 5.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id. at 5.
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party to the suit. Here is an excerpt from the transcript of that
conference:
MR. FITZPATRICK: I am John Fitzpatrick, personal attorney for Joseph
Oat.
THE COURT: Is there no representative of the party Joseph Oat present?
MR. FITZPATRICK: I represent Joseph Oat.
THE COURT: You are an attorney, are you not?
MR. FITZPATRICK: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You are not a principal?
MR. FITZPATRICK: That is correct.
THE COURT: You have authority to settle the case?
MR. FITZPATRICK: I have authority from Joseph Oat. I have discussed
it with him. They gave me authority to speak for him today. The authority
is to make no offer.
THE COURT: You haven't answered my question. The order I issued,
and I made it clear on December 14th, that for purposes of this conference,
with the exception of CSM whose client is in the Netherlands, that each
party in addition to be [sic] represented by counsel would have present the
party itself for purposes of authorizing or discussing settlement in this case,
speaking specifically about the order which is dated December 18th but was
entered I think clearly enough on the 14th. That in addition to counsel,
each party and the insurance carriers of Plaintiff Oat and Defendant RME
shall be represented at the conference in person by a representative having
full authority to settle the case or make decisions relevant to all matters
reasonably anticipated to come before the conference. Then an exception
for CSM because of them being out of the country. I think that is fairly
clear.
As a matter of fact, Mr. Possi called yesterday to find out from my secre-
tary if that is what I really meant; and I would like to have your explana-
tion as to why no one from Joseph Oat is here from [sic] that authority.
MR. FITZPATRICK: I am here as a representative of Joseph Oat which I
understood your order to be. I have discussed this thing thoroughly with
the principals of Joseph Oat. They directed me to come to the conference.
They directed me that I could speak for them, with authority to speak for
them. Their direction was I should make no offer to settle the case. That is
their position. That is the position they chose to take and they designated
me as their representative to communicate that to the court.
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THE COURT: And that is, of course, the function of a lawyer-to speak
for a client and say we are not going to make an offer.
MR. FITZPATRICK: I am speaking-
THE COURT: Please don't interrupt. It is not the function of the lawyer
to say "we will settle the case at a certain amount." The purpose for the
order was clearly to have present at the conference the parties themselves so
that they could make decisions with respect to proposals that were
advanced.
The position that Oat is now taking and indeed took on December 14th
... I take to be in direct violation of the Court's order. I treat that as being
obstructive of the pretrial process under Rule 16, and I will now enter an
order to show cause why Joseph Oat ought not be subjected to sanctions
including attorneys' fees and expenses of the other parties who are present
and such other relief including contempt of Court that may be appropriate
under the circumstances.
I infer from the position that Oat has taken this morning and put on the
record that they refuse to even appear to discuss settlement. Is that a fair
statement?
MR. FITZPATRICK: Your Honor, if you would like me to elaborate, I
can tell you what our position is. It is that we are fully insured and it is the
obligation of our insurance company to make any adjustment or to make
any offer in this case. The insurance company has never denied coverage to
us. They have been providing us a defense over the years. They have never
indicated to us in any way that they were denying coverage or were trying
to step out of this case. We have been depending on them for over a year
now to take charge of this case, which they have, and to settle the case.
I was told last week for the first time by the representative of the insur-
ance carrier that they had not yet arrived at any kind of a conclusion. He
told me they had no offer to make on Friday, but he did not even at that
late date tell me that they were going to deny coverage or not. ...
THE COURT: Obviously this is part of the argument to be given on the
order to show cause. In order to spare you writing very much about the
obvious, Joseph Oat and Company is the defendant in this case and it is
against Joseph and Company a judgment, if any, will be entered. Any
rights of indemnity you may have from someone else is not before the Court
and so I must disagree with the suggestion that Oat's position with regard
to the payment of money is not a proper subject for consideration at a set-
tlement conference ...
I suppose this does raise a second question that I neglected to take up
with respect to Oat and that is the aspect of the order that directed a repre-
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sentative of the insurance carrier having authority to settle the case to be
present and perhaps, Mr. Possi, you would care to address that inasmuch as
it does not appear that anyone from the insurance company is present; but
you have previously indicated that you had been engaged by the insurance
company to defend the defendant, is that correct?
MR. POSSI:... We have been engaged to represent Joseph Oat.... As to
the explanation why no one from National Union is here, I don't know...
but I can tell you Mr. McMahon told me it is National Union's position
since they are not a party to the suit, they are not subject to an order requir-
ing them to be here.
THE COURT: Did you inform the National union [sic] of the order?
MR. POSSI: I informed Mr. McMahon. He informed me he talked to
somebody from National Union.
THE COURT: The order to show cause will be extended to... National
Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh.4°
Six months later, Magistrate Groh sanctioned Oat and its insurer, Na-
tional, for failing to comply with his order of December 18. He ordered
them to pay RME, CSM, and Heileman expenses and costs, including
attorneys' fees, incurred in connection with attending the December 19
settlement conference.
In his order imposing sanctions, Magistrate Groh concluded that he
had ample authority under Rule 16 to require the presence of represented
litigants at a settlement conference.4" In addition, the magistrate refused
to exempt National from the order, relying on In re LaMarre 42 for the
proposition that a defendant's insurer may be subject to such orders be-
cause of its obligations to the insured.
Chief Judge Barbara Crabb declined to reconsider the order, agreeing
that Rule 16 provided authority for a court to order a represented client
to attend a settlement conference.43
40. Transcript of Continued Pretrial Conference before the Honorable James Groh, Dec. 19,
1984, at 3-5, 10-12, G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 107 F.R.D. 275 (W.D. Wis.
1985).
41. Heileman I, 107 F.R.D. at 280-82.
42. 494 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1974).
43. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 107 F.R.D. 275 (W.D. Wis. 1985). Oat and
National had sought reconsideration of the magistrate's sanctioning order, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1991), arguing that his action was clearly erroneous and contrary to law in
that he had no authority under Rule 16 to order a represented party to be present for a settlement
conference. Id. Judge Crabb found the motion untimely. Because Oat had received advance notice,
it should have requested a district judge to modify or vacate the order. Id. at 277. For further
discussions of the opinions of Magistrate Groh and Judge Crabb, see infra Section I.C.
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Why did the lawyers for Oat, John Possi and John Fitzpatrick, have so
much trouble understanding or complying with the magistrate's order?
The explanation I proffer, in Section I.D., below, is that they pictured a
settlement conference that differed markedly from the settlement confer-
ence that the magistrate and the chief judge had envisioned." In Section
I.E., I further argue that a similar difference in vision also separated the
majority and dissenting judges on the Seventh Circuit. In order to set the
backdrop for both those arguments, I will describe in the next section
different ways of looking at what occurs in a settlement conference.
B. Perspectives on Settlement Conferences
A person's expectations about what will happen in a settlement confer-
ence depend on his or her assumptions about lawyer-client relations, ne-
gotiation, and the role of the judicial host. These assumptions are loosely
related to two different perspectives about human relations that now en-
joy great currency. One of these stresses independence and autonomy; it
operates primarily through rational processes and relies heavily on rules.
The other is grounded in relationships, emphasizing interdependence.45
Although all people have both perspectives, one or the other tends to
dominate in each of us.46
44. Attorney John Possi disagrees:
The explanation I offer is that there was no order to understand. The magistrate's settle-
ment conference of December 14, 1984 started at 2:00 on Friday afternoon. It lasted until
approximately 9:00 in the evening. When it ended there was no court reporter present.
The magistrate did express his unhappiness at the position taken by Oat's insurance com-
pany to the effect that its insured was not negligent and no offer would be made. Perhaps
because of this he expressed a desire that "someone" from Joseph Oat should actually be in
attendance at the subsequent settlement.
The following Monday.. [n]one of us were quite sure what it was that the magistrate
wanted and consequently, that led to my attempt to clarify what it was that the magistrate
desired. While it certainly was appropriate for the magistrate not to talk to me directly my
conversation with his clerk did not lead to any clarification. He wanted "someone" from
Joseph Oat...
The magistrate's desires were not reduced to a written order until December 18th. The
written [sic] was not mailed until that day, however, and it was not received in our offices
until after the December 19th settlement conference had been convened.... [T]here was
simply no opportunity to appeal, clarify, or object to any order requiring attendance at the
subsequent settlement conference.
Letter from John Possi to the author (February 1, 1991).
45. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
46. See id. at 24-63.
Gilligan maintains that although both voices are present in all persons, the voice of interdepen-
dence ("caring" as she calls it) tends to be stronger in women, while the rights voice ("autonomy")
tends to predominate in men. Id. at 2. Gilligan's conclusions have been controversial. See, e.g.,
Owen Flanagan & Kathryn Jackson, Justice, Care and Gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate Revis-
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This section uses similar dichotomies to describe different views on
lawyer-client relations, negotiation, and the role of the judge in the settle-
ment conference. 47
L Lawyer-Client Relationships: Traditional and Participatory
Scholars have identified two models of professional-client relation-
ships. Douglas Rosenthal has called these "traditional" and "par-
ticipatory. ' '48  The traditional model is based on the belief that both
client and professional will be better off if the professional, exercising
professional autonomy, makes most of the decisions. The participatory
model assumes, conversely, that shared decisionmaking will produce
more benefits.49
The traditional approach pictures a relatively passive client, seeking
not to understand but rather to follow instructions. The picture makes
sense, given the model's other assumptions: that professionals generally
render effective service because they have high standards and have no
conflicts of interest with their clients, and that professionals deal rou-
tinely with technical problems, the solutions to which are beyond the
understanding of their clients.50 In contrast, the participatory client is
skeptical, actively tries to understand the situation, and helps to make
ited, 97 ETHics 622 (1987). For discussions relating to the implications of such views for legal
education and lawyering, see Symposium, Women in Legal Education-Pedagogy, Law, Theory and
Practice, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1988).
Conley and O'Barr have discerned a comparable dichotomy in the orientations of litigants in
informal courts and have described a continuum between attitudes based upon "rules" and those
based upon "relationships." JOHN W. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELA-
TIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DIsCOURSE (1990).
47. Although systems of categorization help us understand reality, they also distort it. I am
mindful of Robert Benchly's pronouncement that "[there may be said to be two classes of people in
the world: those who constantly divide the people of the world into two classes, and those who do
not." Paul Dickson, The Official Rules, THE WASHINGTONIAN, Nov. 1978, at 152.
48. DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 13 (1974). Shaffer
and Elkins recognize a comparable dichotomy. SHAFFER & ELKINS, supra note 4, at 46-69. So does
Donald Schon, who distinguishes between what he calls "traditional" or "Model I" and "reflective"
or "Model II" professional practice. DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How
PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION 21-76 (1983). Schon points out that while the professional may
have certain technical competencies in problem solving (e.g., dealing with "convergent" problems,
i.e., ones for which there is a rational solution), the professional often is less able than the client to do
the task of "problem-setting"--determining what the client wishes to achieve.
49. In his study of personal injury cases in New York City, Rosenthal found that plaintiffs
actively involved in the preparation of their cases tended to get larger settlements. Rosenthal, supra
note 48, at 29-61.
50. Id. at 18-20.
THE REPRESENTED CLIENT
decisions." The participatory model assumes that professional service
often is ineffective; that the problems presented frequently include open,
unique choices that a layman can understand, not a "single best an-
swer;"52 that it is almost impossible for a professional to render disinter-
ested service; and that standards of practice are neither clear nor
regularly enforced.53
It is the client's responsibility, not the lawyer's, to make the important
substantive decisions in a negotiation, including whether to make, accept,
or reject a settlement proposal.54 However, the decisiomaking process
and the content of particular settlement proposals depend significantly
on the character of the lawyer-client relationship. Two principal tasks
dominate professional-client decisionmaking: defining and solving the
problems. 5 In a participatory relationship, the client has an important
role in both. In an extremely traditional relationship, the professional
dominates both.
An overdrawn example illustrates the difference. Assume a supplier is
sued for breach of contract for allegedly failing to perform its obligations
fully. From the legalistic point of view of a stereotypical "traditional"
lawyer, the problem is how best to defend a breach of contract lawsuit
and avoid a judgment for damages. From the client's perspective, addi-
tional problems may include preserving the possibility of future sales to
the plaintiff or others in the industry, problems that a "participatory"
lawyer-client relationship would recognize more easily. In practice, most
professional-client relations include elements of both models, although
one or the other model tends to dominate.
The traditional model of lawyer-client relations resonates with the
rule-oriented voice of autonomy 56 because it emphasizes the profes-
sional's autonomy from the client. The participatory model, on the other
hand, is more congruent with the voice of interconnection in emphasiz-
ing their interdependence.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 7-7 (1980).
55. SCHON, supra note 48, at 18.
56. See GILLIGAN, supra note 45.
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2. Negotiation: Adversarial and Problem-Solving
Commentators recognize a dichotomy between two different ap-
proaches to negotiation: adversarial and problem-solving or interest-
based. 7 In fact, every thoughtful negotiator uses both approaches and
feels the tension between them. 8 Still, I discuss them separately for the
sake of clarity.
a. Adversarial Negotiation
The adversarial orientation usually assumes that there is a limited re-
source such as money, golf balls, or lima beans, and that the parties must
decide whether and how to divide it. In such a situation, the parties'
interests conflict; what one gains, the other must lose. An adversarial
orientation, of course, fosters strategies designed to maximize the client's
position with respect to the resource in question. The usual tactics are
designed to help the negotiator uncover as much as possible about the
other side's situation while misleading the other side as to his or her own
situation. 9 Normally negotiations conducted with an adversarial orien-
tation result in a "zero-sum" or "win-lose" outcome.
b. Problem-Solving Negotiation
In the problem-solving approach to negotiation, the parties seek to un-
57. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Prob-
lem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984). Some commentators have divided negotiation in other
ways. For example, Fisher and Ury see "hard," "soft," and "principled" negotiation. ROGER
FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN
(1981). Gifford identifies three types of negotiation strategies. "cooperative," "competitive," and
"integrative." DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION (1989). Lowenthal distinguishes be-
tween "competition" and "collaboration." Gary T. Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation
Process, Strategy and Behavior, 31 U. KAN. L. RaV. 69 (1982). Raiffa describes "distributive" and
"integrative" bargaining. HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982).
Lax and Sebenius distinguish between negotiating to "create value" and to "claim value." DAVID A.
LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION
AND COMPETITIVE GAIN (1986). See generally RISKIN & WESTROOK, supra note 1, at 127-138
(1987).
58. LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 57. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
59. Common adversarial strategies include:
1. A high initial demand;
2. limited disclosure of information regarding facts and one's own preferences;
3. few and small concessions;
4. threats and arguments; and
5. apparent commitment to positions during the negotiation process.
Donald G. Gifiord, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46 OHIO ST.
L.J. 41, 48-49 (1985).
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cover the interests underlying each party's position and to develop solu-
tions that "create wealth" or exploit complementary interests. 6°
A position is what someone says he wants; e.g., "I demand $500." An
interest is a need underlying the position. One may demand money, for
instance, to satisfy needs for shelter, food, transportation, respect, or rec-
ognition. Participants who can recognize underlying needs often can de-
velop options to satisfy these needs.
Imagine a seven-year-old boy, about to leave with his parents for din-
ner in an almost-elegant restaurant. He announces that he intends to
take with him ten Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtle figures. His outraged
father declares, "You can't take any." The two assert these positions
repeatedly, each time raising their voices. This is classic, adversarial ne-
gotiation, and the conflict escalates. But then the mother intervenes (as a
mediator), imploring the father to "listen to why he wants to bring the
characters." In response to the father's question, the son replies that he
wants the figures in order to play basketball. The father asks whether
two players on each team would be adequate. When the child says yes,
they have a deal. By learning the child's interest-avoiding boredom-
the father could propose a solution that accommodated that interest as
well as his own interest in having a relatively peaceful meal.
Because it seeks complementary interests, a problem-solving approach
has the potential to change some dispute negotiations into planning for
future relations or transactions. In one mediation, for instance, a dispute
over a bank's obligation to reimburse the expenses of a computer services
supplier turned into a joint venture to market the supplier's services to
other financial institutions.
Clearly, the adversarial approach is grounded in a vision wholly con-
gruent with the voice of autonomy, with a "rights" orientation.61 It
60. The most popular articulation of a problem-solving orientation is FISHER & URY, supra
note 57. The authors set out four guidelines for what they call "principled negotiation:"
1. Separate the people from the problem.
2. Focus on interests, not positions.
3. Invent options for mutual gain.
4. Insist on objective criteria.
Id. at 15. See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 57, at 794-829.
Professors Deborah Kolb and Gloria Coolidge have suggested a third approach to negotiation,
one conducted "in a woman's voice." Deborah M. Kolb & Gloria G. Coolidge, Her Place at the
Table: A Consideration of Gender Issues in Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE
261 (J. William Breslin & Jeffery Z. Rubin eds., 1991).
61. See Lloyd Burton et al., Feminist Jurisprudence, Professional Ethics, and Gender-Related
Differences in Attorney Negotiating Styles, 1992 J. Disp. Resol. -.
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tends to arise in traditional lawyer-client relationships because often law-
yers operate using what I have called the "lawyer's standard philosophi-
cal map."'62 This orientation emphasizes rights, rules, and autonomy,
often at the expense of interests and interconnections. Thus, the auton-
omy perspective on human relationships and the traditional perspective
in lawyer-client relations tend to foster adversarial negotiation63 for sev-
eral reasons. First, the traditional model permits the professional's view
of the problem and its solution to dominate. Second, the attorney often
lacks the detailed and nuanced understanding of the client's situation
necessary for problem-solving. Third, the strength of the traditional
model rests partly on the lawyer's claim to expertise, which permits him
to keep control and distance, to wear a kind of professional mask.' To
the extent that the lawyer engages in problem-solving, he loses some of
his claim to expertise.
The problem-solving approach to negotiation, on the other hand, is
more congruent with the voice of interconnection in human relation-
ships; both seek to deal with underlying interests rather than rules.
Problem-solving negotiation more often arises in a participatory lawyer-
client relationship because the client, who may know more about what he
or she needs than does the lawyer, has a greater opportunity to contrib-
ute to the definition and solution of the problem.
Both approaches to negotiation, however, compete with one another in
virtually every negotiation.65 Adversarial negotiation usually is em-
ployed to divide even those pies enlarged through interest-based negotia-
tion.6 6 Techniques that foster one approach impede the other. Thus, if a
negotiator representing a plaintiff in a medical malpractice claim hides
one of her client's true interests (e.g., his concern about the hospital's
supervision practices), she is less likely to secure a change in these prac-
tices as part of the solution. On the other hand, a negotiator who reveals
this interest becomes vulnerable to a hospital negotiator who might insist
62. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 29, 43-44 (1982).
63. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 697 (1988); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the
Dispute Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 1985 Mo. J. Disp. RESOL. 25, 31-34.
64. SHAFFER & ELKINS, supra note 48, at 46-66. This is not to gainsay that sometimes the
lawyer, because of an ability to be more objective, may see some aspects of the client's situation more
clearly than the client does.
65. LAx & SEBENIUS, supra note 57.
66. See James J. White, The Pros and Cons of "Getting to Yes," 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 115, 116
(1984)(reviewing ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETrING TO YES (1981)); but see Comment by
Roger Fisher, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 120, 121-23 (1984).
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that the plaintiff trade off a good portion of his monetary demands.67
Any good negotiator must address this tension. Skillful negotiators
recognize that successful negotiation requires a mix of the adversarial
and problem-solving approaches.68 Similarly, in a successful lawyer-cli-
ent relationship, elements of both professional autonomy and shared de-
cision-making will develop. The problem, of course, is that sometimes
lawyers who develop a strong adversarial focus in preparing for trial have
trouble broadening their visions in the settlement discussion to include
underlying interests.69
3. The Role of the Judicial Host
Two issues infuse most discussions of the role of the judicial host in the
settlement conference. The first is the extent to which the judge should
encourage the parties to explore opportunities for problem-solving nego-
tiation when the case comes to court in a narrow adversarial posture.
The second is the extent to which the judicial host should extend a hand
to facilitate negotiations or raise afist to threaten the parties with conse-
quences for not settling. Of course, many good settlement judges under-
take all of these activities in varying degrees.7"
a. Facilitating Adversarial or Problem-Solving Negotiation
Mediation is facilitated negotiation, and, accordingly, a judicially
hosted settlement conference is a form of mediation. Mediators, whether
judicial or not, can facilitate negotiations based on adversarial or prob-
lem-solving principles, or both.71 Most of the commentary on nonjudi-
67. For an elaboration of this notion, see LAx & SEBENIUS, supra note 57, at 34-35.
68. RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 175-76.
69. Jonathan M. Hyman, Trial Advocacy and Methods of Negotiation: Can Good Trial Advo-
cates be Wise Negotiators?, 34 UCLA L. REv. 863 (1987).
70. See Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 337, 348-359 (1986).
71. See Leonard L. Riskin, The Lawyer's Standard Philosophical Map Revisited, in RISKIN &
WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 206-07. Professor Robert A. Baruch Bush has identified three concep-
tions of the mediator's role: efficiency, protection of rights, and empowerment and recognition.
Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition?: The Media-
tor's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 253 (1989). Although the paral-
lels are not precise, the efficiency and protection of rights conceptions assume adversarial
negotiations while the empowerment and recognition perspective encourages what I have called
problem-solving negotiation. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Res-
olution and Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL PROB. 1 (1989).
The distinction also is recognized in the recent report, SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION COMMITTEE ON LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SET-
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cial mediation touts mediation's potential for facilitating problem-solving
negotiation.72 Yet much of the commentary on judicial settlement con-
ferences emphasizes adversarial goals, strategies, and techniques. This
literature assumes that the trial process generates just results and there-
fore that the proper goal of a settlement process is to acheive a similar
result.73
The basic responsibility of a judicial host in such a negotiation would
be to keep the participants focused upon the principal issue, which often
is who will pay how much to whom. A principal strategy might be to
undermine a party's confidence in his position, so as to encourage com-
promise. Thus, the judicial host might predict that each party runs a
high risk of suffering an undesirable judgment, or the host might ensure
that each party understands the strengths and weaknesses of both sides of
the case, and the costs of proceeding in litigation.74
Although an adversarial perspective dominates the world of litigation,
including the conduct of most settlement conferences, judges increasingly
TLEMENT COERCION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS IT RELATES TO THE COURTS 20-21 (1991) [herein-
after SPIDR Report].
72. Much of this literature goes even further, arguing that mediation can foster such goals as
empowerment and recognition, and even can heal wounded relationships and improve communities.
See, e.g., Bush, supra note 71; Riskin, supra note 62.
73. See, e-g., Hubert L. Will et al., The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75 F.R.D.
203, 206-207 (1986); Schuck, supra note 70.
This ought to surprise no one. The adversarial perspective dominates litigation, and court-based
dispute resolution tends to take on the characteristics of the process it replaces. Deborah M. Kolb,
How Existing Procedure Shape Alternatives: The Case of Grievance Mediation, 1989 J. DIsP. RESOL.
59, 68-69; J. Michael Keating, Jr. & Margaret L. Shaw, "Compared to What?" Defining Terms in
Court-Related ADR Programs, 6 NEGOTIATION J. 217, 218-20 (1990).
Some commentators, expressing an extreme rights orientation akin to adversarialism, suggest that
society should not encourage judges to facilitate settlements. See, eg., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settle-
ment, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
A number of other methods of dispute resolution-the mini-trial, summary jury trial, and court-
annexed arbitration-focus on helping the parties predict what would happen in trial as a way to
encourage a negotiated settlement. One of these, the mini-trial, is specifically intended to give the
client a more active role in decisionmaking. It ensures the client's heavy exposure to the merits of
each side's case, while also placing the client, rather than the lawyer, in the first-line negotiator's
position, which turns the settlement question into a business decision. For descriptions of these
processes, see DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON & IRVINE ADR PRACTICE BOOK (. Wilkinson ed.,
1990); RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1; LINDA R. SINGER, SETTLING DISPUTES 15-31 (1990).
These processes also give the litigants a chance to lay out their cases, to have a "day in court."
And, although the parties themselves typically are not required to attend such proceedings, they
generally do so.
74. Such techniques encourage compromise and may make problem-solving approaches seem
more appealing.
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hear the problem-solving voice. The judicial host can help the parties
focus on their underlying interests75 and try to broaden the dispute be-
yond the narrow legal and factual issues.7 6
b. Raising a Fist or Extending a Hand
The other dichotomy concerns the extent to which the judicial host
either raises a fist to pressure the parties to settle or extends a hand to
facilitate an educational process that will enable the parties to learn and
do what they must in order to reach a settlement decision.
A number of techniques work primarily to pressure parties to settle.77
Some of these were listed above as ways to promote adversarial negotia-
tion, such as undermining a party's confidence in its own position, for
instance, by predicting adverse consequences at trial or threatening to
dismiss. 78  Others, such as setting an early and firm trial date, could help
induce either adversarial or problem-solving negotiation. Pushing the
parties to accept a particular settlement is another technique. In some
cases, a judge might require a client to attend a settlement conference in
order to impose economic or time pressure to settle.7 9
Techniques available to help parties learn what they need to know to
settle are more varied."0 They include the many methods of facilitating
75. WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR LAW-
YERS AND JUDGES 51, 501-03 (1988).
76. Id. at 501-03. See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 57.
77. Professor E. Donald Elliott seems completely dominated by an adversarial vision when he
writes, from a law and economics perspective: "The essential function of managerial judging is to
increase the price of procedure. One can in fact define managerial judging as the selective imposition
by judges of costs on lawyers for the purpose of rationing the use of procedures available under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of
Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 306, 312 (1986). Professor David Shapiro conceptualizes the issue
Heileman raises as relating "to the authority of judges to nudge, or shove, the parties toward settle-
ment." David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1989 (1989).
78. Professor James Alfini has identified three styles of mediation in civil cases in Florida. Par-
allels are not precise, but the "trashers" and "bashers" seem to be raising their fists and promoting
adversarial negotiation, while the "hashers" are extending their hands and may be open to problem-
solving. James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of "Good Media-
ion?", 19 FLA. ST. L. REV. 47 (1991). For a catalogue of settlement techniques, see James A. Wall,
Jr & Dale E. Rude, Judicial Mediation: Techniques, Strategies and Situational Effects, 41 J. Soc.
ISSUES 47, 53-5, 58 (1985).
79. In informal conversations, judges, lawyers, and scholars often maintain that this is fre-
quently the purpose behind judicial orders commanding a litigant to attend personally.
80. Kenneth Kressel & Dean G. Pruitt, Themes in the Mediation of Social Conflict, 41 J. Soc.
IssuEs 179 (1985), would call these "contextual" interventions and distinguish them from "substan-
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problem-solving negotiation, such as searching for underlying interests
and developing options that meet such interests or exploit complemen-
tary needs."1 They also could include allowing the clients to be present
to ensure that they understand the strengths and weaknesses of both
sides of the case.
The essence of "extending a hand" is expressed in the term "judicial
host," used by Magistrate Wayne Brazil to refer to the federal judge or
magistrate presiding at a settlement conference."2 The host analogy sug-
gests an obligation to make the parties comfortable, to help them define
and settle their dispute.
The host pays attention to the circumstances of each case and helps
the parties overcome barriers to settlement. Often, this is best done by
helping the litigants consider alternative methods of dispute resolution.83
Thus, if the parties cannot settle because of different views of how a jury
would decide the case, the judge could make his own prediction or could
suggest a summary jury trial (in which a jury renders a non-binding ver-
dict).84 If a welter of difficult factual and legal questions blocks settle-
ment, the judge could make sure they understand the potential value of a
minitrial. If they simply have trouble negotiating and the settlement
judge lacks the time or skills required to help them, he could suggest
mediation. If a genuine disagreement about the applicable law stymies
their negotiations, the judge could suggest summary judgment motions
or could make his own prediction. If poor or shallow personal relations
are the stumbling block, the host could act as the go-between or could
help them improve their relationship. 5
Frank Scardilli, Senior Staff Counsel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for
tive" interventions, which are intended to "narrow the gap and precipitate a settlement," and from
"reflexive" interventions, which are undertaken to impress the parties with the mediator's expertise.
Id. at 192.
For a discussion of the "contingencies" that seem to produce certain mediator strategies, see
Rodney G. Lim & Peter J.D. Carnevale, Contingencies in the Mediation of Disputes, 58 J. PERSON-
ALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 259 (1990).
81. See supra text accompanying note 59.
82. BRAZIL, supra note 75.
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) authorizes such discussions.
84. See Lambros, supra note 24, at 373.
85. Judge Robert Merhige must have had this in mind when he held a cocktail and dinner party
in his home for the lawyers and clients in a difficult-to-settle matter, a party at which he prohibited
them from discussing the case. Will, supra note 73, at 212-13.
For discussions of the considerations in choosing methods of dispute resolution, see STEPHEN B.
GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 545-48 (1985); RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at
451-56.
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the Second Circuit, tells of a case he mediated between two brothers.
The legal issue involved partnership law. The case settled and the broth-
ers renewed an old friendship, but only after Scardilli asked them two
personal questions: "What was your relationship as children?" and
"What would your parents [who were deceased] think if they saw you
here in the Court of Appeals?" In asking these questions, Scardilli
broadened the dispute. Thus he helped the brothers deal with a major
barrier to settlement-the deterioration in their personal relationship. 6
4. Relations Among the Perspectives
As I have indicated, certain perspectives in one sphere seem congruent
with certain perspectives in the other spheres. Thus, there is an apparent
logical consistency, or a set of shared assumptions, among the perspec-
tives I call "Model I" on the chart below.87 Such assumptions include
the autonomy perspective on human relations, the traditional perspective
on lawyer-client relations, the adversarial perspectives on negotiations
and on the role of the judicial host in the settlement conference, and the
idea that such a host should raise a fist to promote settlement.8 8 Much
writing assumes that these perspectives define the world of judicial settle-
ment conferences.8 9 Similarly, the remaining perspectives, which I have
grouped into "Model II" on the chart, also cluster together naturally.
These include the interconnection perspective in human relations, the
participatory perspective in lawyer-client relations, the problem-solving
perspective in negotiation and in judicial settlement conferences, and the
idea that the judicial host should extend a hand, rather than raise a fist,
to facilitate settlement.' Put simply, the Model I visions ordinarily as-
sume conflicting participant interests, while the Model II visions assume
that seeking out complementary interests might prove valuable.
86. Telephone Interview with Frank Scardilli (Jan. 2, 1991).
87. These numbers derive from the Model I and Model II notions developed by Professor Don-
ald Schon. SCHON, supra note 48, at 21-76.
88. See supra notes 56, 61-64 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 64, 80-83 and accompanying text.
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[Sphere Model II Model II
Human Relations Autonomy (Rights) Interconnection
Lawyer-Client Traditional Participatory
Relations
Negotiation Adversarial Problem-Solving
Judicial Settlement Adversarial (Fist) Problem-Solving (Hand)
In practice, the perspectives I have grouped into Models are not al-
ways found together. Thus, a traditional lawyer-client relationship, for
instance, can produce problem-solving negotiation, although it is less
likely to do so than is a participatory relationship. In each of these
spheres of activity, both perspectives exert competing tugs on the partici-
pants. In any lawyer-client relationship a tension develops between the
need for the lawyer to dominate some aspects of the relationship and the
need for lawyer and client to work collaboratively. A good negotiator
must use both adversarial and problem-solving strategies. A judge who
attempts to facilitate settlements should allow and encourage both types
of settlement strategies, and should extend his hand at least as often as he
raises his fist.
Often, however, people lean toward similar perspectives in each sphere
of activity. Many people tend toward one or the other model in the same
sense that they are likely to choose all lightweight, casual clothes for an
August visit to a Caribbean resort. A traveller who hopes for an invita-
tion to a formal dinner party might pack some other clothes. Thus, one's
expectations about the events of the vacation govern how one packs. In
the same sense, a judge or lawyer who normally envisions a traditional
lawyer-client relationship might tend to assume that all negotiations will
be adversarial and involve only lawyers.91 Those who can see other pos-
91. An important caveat is in order: people only tend toward consistency in their views. All
people have both perspectives, and may decide which is most appropriate in a given situation. Thus,
a lawyer or judge who tends toward adversarial approaches may decide that problem-solving is best
in a particular case. And a lawyer may tend toward an ethic of caring in his personal morality yet
believe that in his role as lawyer he must be adversarial.
Rand Jack and Dana Crowley Jack conducted extensive interviews with 18 female and 18 male
lawyers in western Washington state. In their book, RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL
VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAW-
YERS (1989), they examine the tension lawyers face in reconciling their personal morality, which-
especially for women-is often based on caring, with their professional morality, which some believe
must be grounded on rights. Their discussion addresses neither these issues nor the context of nego-
tiations, but rather focuses on situations in which the client's interests conflict strongly with impor-
tant societal interests. Id.
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sibilities will be more open. At any rate, a person's expectations about
what will happen in a settlement conference depend on his or her as-
sumptions about lawyer-client relationships, about negotiation, and
about the role of the judicial host.
C. The District Court Revisited
The forgoing helps us begin to understand the difficulty Oat's lawyers
had in understanding the magistrate's order. They pictured only one de-
sirable outcome of the settlement conference: National would make a
substantial money offer that RME would accept. They envisioned adver-
sarial negotiation and saw no role in this negotiation for the Oat Corpo-
ration. Had they seen a possibility of problem-solving negotiation,92 they
might have appreciated the potential value of the participation of an ad-
ditional corporate representative armed with full settlement authority.
93
Since no insurance company representative would attend the second con-
ference, the Oat lawyers envisioned no feasible, desirable outcome. Fitz-
patrick attended only to convey Oat's position, and apparently thought
his attendance constituted compliance with the order. In fact, he did
have all the authority that the corporation made available. The decision
not to send a corporate principal, then, could have been part of a strategy
to pressure the insurance carrier to make an offer. 94
92. Based on my telephone interviews with John Fitzpatrick (April 19, 1989) and John Possi
(April 19, 1989), I believe that the parties at some point explored the possibility that Oat would
continue to provide some services to Heileman in connection with the waste water treatment system.
Apparently because others employed by Heileman corrected the deficiencies in the system, the par-
ties did not see a future relationship as desirable.
93. See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
94. If the settlement conference had proceeded in a more routine fashion, i.e., if McMahon had
made a settlement offer that was acceptable to RME, Possi and Fitzpatrick might have felt their
interpretation of the magistrate's order-that Fitzpatrick's attendance would constitute compli-
ance-was validated, and, I suspect, the magistrate also would have been satisfied.
As to why National sent no representative to the second settlement conference, my speculation
must be even more rank. National may have believed it was not subject to the order since it was not
a party to the suit. That position had been rejected in another circuit. In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753
(6th Cir. 1974).
National apparently thought this case was distinguishable from La Marre in part because Wiscon-
sin, unlike Michigan-where La Marre arose-allowed direct action against a party's insurer, and
none of the litigants made National a direct party. Letter from John Possi to the author (Feb. 1,
1991). A subsequent decision of the Eleventh Circuit also would support National's belief that it was
not subject to the order, but that decision would have required it to follow appropriate procedures to
challenge the order. In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397 (11th Cir. 1991), discussed supra note 25.
A lawyer familiar with the case suggested to me that National's decision against sending a repre-
sentative to the conference could have been a strategic move in the adversarial negotiation, intended
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In sum, it seems likely that the lawyers and executives for Oat pictured
a settlement conference featuring adversarial negotiation among lawyers,
without direct client involvement. They also might have assumed that
the magistrate intended to apply pressure on them to settle, or that he
had already applied pressure by ordering a corporate representative to
attend. In other words, they embraced Model I perspectives.
In contrast, Magistrate Groh and Chief Judge Crabb seemed to as-
sume that the settlement conference would allow for both Model I and
Model II features. Although the magistrate concluded that Rule 16 gave
him ample authority to compel the presence of "the parties them-
selves,"95 he did not seem to envision any coercion toward settlement
once the parties were present: "... these settlement conferences were not
attempts to bludgeon unwilling litigants into submission, but rather a
response to the request of the majority of the litigants who earnestly
sought compromise."96 And, plainly, he saw opportunities for both ad-
versarial and problem-solving negotiation:
The authority to convene a settlement conference under Rule 16 is a
hollow authority indeed if the power is lacking to require the presence at
the conference of the parties themselves. Only in that way may proposals
and counter-proposals be advanced and responded to without delay. The
presence of the parties, who are, of course, the most familiar with their
claims and the nature of their businesses, also opens opportunities to ex-
plore the existence of other common grounds for agreement which may
involve matters outside the litigation.97
Thus, it seems clear that Magistrate Groh was open to either adversarial
or problem-solving negotiation, or both.98
Chief Judge Crabb believed this when she declined to reconsider the
order.99 In addition to finding that the motion for reconsideration came
to reduce the expectations of plaintiff Heileman. The move also might have helped National save
time or avoid the possibility of feeling pressure to make a payment. To the extent that this was a
deliberate strategy, the company also must have assumed that the settlement conference would have
facilitated an adversarial negotiation over how much money it would pay, and when. National's
attorney believes that the "magistrate, by temperment and personality, was not so much a facilitator
of settlement, but, in my view, acted with a heavy hand throughout the litigation process." Letter
from John Possi to the author (Feb. 1, 1991).
95. Heileman 1, 107 F.R.D at 281.
96. Id. at 280.
97. Id. at 281.
98. But see quotation from the Letter from John Possi to the author, supra note 94.
99. Id. at 277.
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too late,1" she concluded that Rule 16 provides authority for a court to
require the presence of parties at a settlement conference "in appropriate
situations," and she found that this was an appropriate situation. 101
Judge Crabb plainly shared the magistrate's understanding that repre-
sentatives with full settlement authority could engage in problem-solving
as well as adversarial negotiation; she suggested that they could have
"explore[d] the existence of other common grounds for agreement which
may involve matters outside the litigation" and that they might have be-
come "aware of all aspects of the case and the anticipated costs of its
prosecution and defense."1°2 Thus, both Magistrate Groh and Judge
Crabb seemed to envision the magistrate extending his hand to create an
open, facilitative, noncoercive process that allowed for both problem-
solving negotiation and repeated offers and counter offers in an adver-
sarial negotiation. They anticipated that clients might become more will-
ing and able to settle their case if they were exposed to the other side's
views and to the costs of litigation.
This perception, as I shall argue below, also formed the basis for the
majority decision in the Court of Appeals.
D. In The Court of Appeals
Oat appealed, but National did not. In June, 1988, a three-judge panel
of the Seventh Circuit reversed Judge Crabb's order, holding 2-1 that a
federal district court was not authorized to order a represented party to
send to a settlement conference, along with its attorney, a representative
having full settlement authority. The sanctions, therefore, could not
stand."°  Shortly thereafter, however, the court ordered a rehearing en
banc.
This appeal obviously pained the Seventh Circuit. On rehearing, a six-
judge majority disagreed with the panel and affirmed the district court;
the five dissenters each wrote a separate opinion. I explain the split by
arguing that the majority and dissenting judges entertained sharply dif-
ferent conceptions about the nature of settlement conferences, including
100. See supra note 44.
101. Heileman I, 107 F.R.D. at 277.
Judge Crabb also argued that recent amendments to the Federal Rules gave courts the ability to
manage their docket, and she considered it "a misuse of [expensive public] resources for any party to
refuse even to meet personally with the opposing party or its counsel to attempt to resolve their
disputes prior to trial." Id.
102. Id. at 277.
103. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 848 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1988).
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the types of lawyer-client relations, negotiation approaches, and judicial
interventions that characterize such conferences.
L The Majority
In the majority opinion, Judge Kanne ruled that a federal court has
authority to order represented litigants to appear at a pretrial settlement
conference, that ordering Oat to send a representative with full settle-
ment authority was not an abuse of the magistrate's discretion, and that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering sanctions.1°4
Joseph Oat Corporation had argued that the power Rule 16(a)(5) t°5
gives the court to order attorneys and unrepresented parties to appear at
a settlement conference impliedly negates the court's authority to order
represented parties to attend such conferences. Judge Kanne concluded,
however, that this language did not preclude the order because the rules
themselves do not limit the "inherent" authority of a federal court unless
they expressly impose such limits. Rule 16 does not so limit a court's
authority. Indeed, the very purpose of Rule 16 was to permit courts to
manage their dockets actively.10 6
Oat Corporation argued in the alternative that the court abused its
authority in light of the expense and burden to Joseph Oat, noting that
the business was "a going concern" and the "principal" would have had
to travel from Camden, New Jersey to Madison, Wisconsin. Judge
Kanne agreed "that circumstances could arise in which requiring a cor-
porate representative (or any litigant) to appear at a pretrial settlement
conference would be so onerous, so clearly unproductive, or so expensive
in relation to the size, value, and complexity of the case that it might be
an abuse of discretion."10 7 However, he held that the order in question
was not an abuse of discretion given the great size and complexity of the
case. 108
104. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5). For the text of Rule 16(2)(5), see supra note 22.
106. Heileman II, 871 F.2d at 650-63.
107. Id. at 654. The majority also concluded that the Joseph Oat Corporation was obligated to
comply with the order because it had failed to object to the order before the second conference, Id.
Finally, the court held that while the initial verbal order may have been "somewhat ambigous" the
subsequent written order, and the magistrate's subsequent remarks, eliminated any such ambiguity.
Id. at 655-56.
108. "This litigation involved a claim for $4 million-a claim which turned upon the resolution
of complex factual and legal issues. The litigants expected the trial to last from one to three months
and all parties stood to incur substantial legal fees and trial expenses. This trial also would have
preempted a large segment of judicial time-not an insignificant factor." Id. at 654.
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Judge Kanne plainly shared the expectation of the Magistrate and
Judge Crabb that there would be no coercion in the settlement confer-
ence. Recognizing the distinction between a requirement to attend a con-
ference and a requirement to settle, he explained:
"[A]uthority to settle," when used in the context of this case, means that
the "corporate representative" attending the pretrial conference was re-
quired to hold a position within the corporate entity allowing him to speak
definitively and to commit the corporation to a particular position in the
litigation. We do not view "authority to settle" as a requirement that cor-
porate representatives must come to court willing to settle on someone
else's terms, but only that they come to court in order to consider the possibil-
ity of settlement.
If this case represented a situation where Oat Corporation had sent a
corporate representative and was sanctioned because that person refused to
make an offer to pay money-that is, refused to submit to settlement coer-
cion-we would be faced with a decidedly different issue-a situation we
would not countenance. 1°9
The assumption that there would be no coercion in, though there may
have been coercion into, 110 the settlement conference, informs the major-
ity opinion. The opinion, accordingly, allows for, but does not explicitly
invoke, the vision of a settlement conference that Magistrate Groh and
Judge Crabb shared." 1 Thus, although the magistrate's order com-
manded the attendance of a corporate representative with full settlement
authority, neither the magistrate nor the district judge nor the majority
of the Seventh Circuit thought the order inappropriately coercive be-
cause they did not envision that further pressure toward settlement
would be used. The dissenters saw a different picture.
2. The Dissents
The dissenters, as I illustrate below, partook of a vision drenched in
adversarialism and drawn entirely from Model I perspectives. Not all
the judges saw adversarialism in all aspects of the settlement conference;
some emphasized the adversarial qualities of the judicial host, others saw
109. Id. at 653 (emphasis added).
110, The distinction between coercion into and coercion in a settlement conference also has been
recognized as crucial in a recent report of the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution.
SPIDR Report, supra note 71, at 5-6.
111. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
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such qualities in the lawyers or their clients. The composite picture
drawn by the dissenters, however, includes: 1) a judge who takes sides
during the settlement conference, coercing parties into exchanging offers;
2) adversarial (and not problem-solving) negotiation; 3) "traditional"
lawyer-client relationships, in which the lawyers, impelled as much by
fear of malpractice suits as by their affirmative duties to client and court,
competently convey all information relevant to the client's settlement de-
cision; and 4) clients who need their lawyers to shield them from speak-
ing to the judge or opposition, for fear that they might make a damaging
statement, and whose innocent (and salutory) belief in the impartiality of
judges would be shattered by exposure to the judge's conduct in a settle-
ment conference.
So, while the magistrate, the chief district judge and, probably, the
Seventh Circuit majority thought the settlement conference might in-
clude aspects of both Model I and Model II features, the dissenters envi-
sioned only Model I.
Although all the dissenting opinions held that the magistrate lacked
authority to issue the order in question, two different types of analyses
emerged. Judges Manion, Coffey, and Ripple concluded that neither
Rule 16 nor their inherent authority empowered district courts to order a
represented client to attend a settlement conference. The other two opin-
ions, those of Judges Posner and Easterbrook, took no position on the
question whether, in an appropriate case, a district court could require
the presence of a represented party at a settlement conference. They
maintained, however, that the magistrate's order in this case constituted
an abuse of discretion.
a. The Coffey, Ripple, and Manion Dissents
The Coffey, Ripple, and Manion dissents accepted the argument that
the majority rejected: Rule 16(a)(5)'s explicit grant of authority to direct
attorneys and unrepresented parties to attend a settlement conference
did not give a court the authority to require the attendance of repre-
sented parties.
Judge Coffey argued that courts may not exercise their inherent au-
thority in a manner inconsistent with the rule and that the federal rules,
the result of a careful process involving both Congress and the courts, are
designed to consider needs both for efficiency and for protection of indi-
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vidual rights.112 Judge Ripple followed the same analysis and stressed
the danger of the majority's decision on "the relationship between the
judiciary and Congress in establishing practice and procedure for the fed-
eral courts." 1 3 Both Judge Manion" 4 and Judge Coffey" 5 stressed Rule
16's consistent differentiation of represented parties and attorneys.
I agree with Judge Posner that the conclusions of Coffey, Ripple, and
Manion were as supportable "on narrowly 'legal' considerations" as the
majority's conclusion.'1 6 However, I wish to explore the dissenters' un-
derlying assumptions.
Each of these judges worried that the majority's conclusion would im-
pair traditional, hierarchical (Model I) arrangements in settlement con-
ferences. Judge Coffey seemed to think that settlement discussions
should not even be an important part of the pretrial conference which, he
stated, was intended solely "to discuss the upcoming trial, to frame and
define the issues, and through custom to explore with the consent of the
litigant's attorneys, in very limited situations, the discussion of settlement
possibilities."' 1 7 He argued an attorney need not produce his client be-
cause the client might make a damaging admission"1 8 or because the cli-
ent who appears could conclude that the process is unfair.
I believe that we are all aware of the fact that the appearance of fairness,
impartiality and justice is all imperative, and based upon logic I fail to un-
derstand how a litigant sitting at a command appearance before a judge who
injects himself into an adversarial role for either of the parties' positions
during settlement negotiations can feel that he or she (the litigant) will have
a fair trial before the judge if he or she fails to agree with the judge's reason-
112. Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 658 (Coffey, J., dissenting, joined by Easterbrook, Ripple, and
Manion, JJ.).
113. Id. at 665 (Ripple, J., dissenting, joined by Coffey, J.).
114. Id. at 666 (Manion, J., dissenting, joined by Coffey, Easterbrook, and Ripple, JJ.).
115. Judge Coffey wrote:
Rule 16(b), concerning scheduling, requires a judge to "consult with the attorneys for the
parties and any unrepresented parties." Rule 16(c), regarding subjects to be discussed at a
pretrial conference, states that "[a]t least one of the attorneys for each party participating
in any conference before trial shall have authority to enter into stipulations and to make
admissions regarding all matters that the participants may reasonably anticipate may be
discussed." Similarly, Rule 16(d), concerning final pretrial conferences, provides that
"[t]he conference shall be attended by at least one of the attorneys who will conduct the
trial for each of the parties and by any unrepresented parties."
Id. at 660 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 657. (Posner, J., dissenting). The Civil Justice Improvement Act of 1990 seems to
have vindicated the majority's conclusion. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
117. Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 660 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 662.
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ing or direction regarding a recommended settlement.... Since litigants
are neither trained in the law nor have the basic understanding of the nu-
ances of legal proceedings that we as lawyers have gained through years of
education, professional training and experience, they could well be confused
and dismayed with judicial participation in settlement negotiations. 19
Similarly, Judge Manion emphasized the importance of the role of
counsel and a litigant's "right" to be represented by an attorney.
120
Although he acknowledged that some attorneys may not always convey
all relevant information to the client, he stressed the pressures on the
attorney to do so.
Rule 16's distinction between represented and unrepresented parties is
consistent with a litigant's statutory right to representation by an attorney.
It is also consistent with the attorney's traditional role in litigation. Liti-
gants hire attorneys to take advantage of the attorney's training and skill
and, as Judge Posner notes, "to economize on their own investment of time
in resolving disputes.". . . Part of an attorney's expertise includes evaluat-
ing cases, advising litigants whether or not to settle, and conducting negoti-
ations. I realize that attorneys may sometimes convey inadequate
information to their clients regarding settlement. But an attorney has a
strong self interest in realistically conveying to the client relevant informa-
tion necessary for the client to make an informed settlement decision, and
in accurately conveying the client's settlement position to the court and
opposing litigants. The attorney also has an ethical duty to convey that
information. The threat of malpractice suits and disciplinary proceedings
should be sufficient to make any attorney think twice before trying to mis-
lead his client or the court. Attorneys play an important role in our adver-
sary system, and we should not denigrate that role by presuming that
attorneys will be incompetent to perform one of the most important func-
tions for which their clients hire them. Nor should we presume that Rule
16's drafters meant to encroach on a litigant's right to conduct his case
through counsel.' 2 1
119. Id. (emphasis in original). Here Judge Coffey assumed that the trial judge would conduct
the pretrial conference. In Heileman, the magistrate who conducted the pretrial conferences would
not have tried the case. Many federal district courts now use such an arrangement to avoid some of
the problems Judge Coffey suggests, as well as others. For a discussion of the advantages and disad-
vantages of employing the same judge to mediate and try a case, see BRAZIL, supra note 75, at 104-
08. Professor Judith Resnik suggests prohibiting the practice. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 374, 435 (1982).
Judge Coffey also assumed that the judge will be, or appear to be, authoritarian. What else could
explaln his suggestion that the client might think he would not get a fair trial "if he or she fails to
agree with the judge's reasoning or direction"? Heileman II, 871 F.2d at 662.
120. Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 667 (Manion, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 667.
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Finally, Judge Manion's unwillingness or inability to recognize the po-
tentially enormous difference between requiring attendance and requiring
negotiation 22 is explicable only if based on assumptions of adversarial
negotiation and coercive practices by the magistrate. These same as-
sumptions probably also inspired Judge Ripple's concern that the major-
ity opinion will be "used to justify far more questionable 'innovations'
than the strong-arm settlement methodology of the magistrate at issue in
this opinion."'' 2
3
b. The Posner and Easterbrook Dissents
Judges Posner and Easterbrook took no position on whether a district
court had authority to order a represented client to attend a settlement
conference. Instead they maintained that even if such authority existed,
it did not authorize the order in question. Although they recognized the
possibility of a more open settlement process, they believed that the con-
ference itself would have been coercive, i.e., that Magistrate Groh must
have intended to require adversarial bargaining through the exchange of
monetary offers. Thus, Judge Posner thought that the order, which was
different from a demand that a party who has not closed the door to settle-
ment send an executive to discuss possible terms, would be defensible only
if litigants had a duty to bargain in good faith over settlement before resort-
122.
The majority... [draws] a distinction between being required to attend a settlement con-
ference and being required to negotiate. This distinction is puzzling. I suppose that if a
represented party is required to come to court to state his position--even if that position is
simply, "I refuse to settle. See you at trial."-that would not be requiring the represented
party to "negotiate." But if that is all the majority is requiring, the majority has recog-
nized nothing more than a district court's inherent power to waste litigant's time in doing
what their attorneys could have done (and were hired to do)....
But requiring that a party consider the possibility of settlement and that the party have
authority to settle if another party proposes acceptable terms presupposes that besides stat-
ing his own position, the party must sit and listen to other parties' (and, possibly, the
court's) proposals.... It appears that the court is saying that a district court may order a
represented party to appear in court both to talk and listen about settlement-in other
words to actually discuss settlement. I cannot see any meaningful distinction between this
kind of activity and "negotiation;" after all, negotiation in large measure simply involves
discussion. If a distinction does exist, it is so blurry as to be almost invisible, and certainly
difficult, if not impossible, to enforce. The distinction is especially elusive in this case be-
cause... the magistrate's order that Oat send a representative with "authority to settle"
could only mean that Oat's representative had to have the ability to settle by paying
moneY--even if, as the majority claims, "authority to settle" did not mean that the repre-
sentative had to be willing to use that ability. What is the point of insisting on such author-
ity if not to require negotiation?
Id at 669 (emphasis in original).
123. Id. at 666 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
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ing to trial, and neither Rule 16 or any other rule, statute, or doctrine im-
poses such a duty on federal litigants ... [citing cases] ...There is no
federal judicial power to coerce settlement. Oat had made clear that it was
not prepared to settle the case on any terms that required it to pay money.
That was its prerogative, which once exercised made the magistrate's con-
tinued insistence on Oat's sending an executive to Madison arbitrary, un-
reasonable, wilful, and indeed petulant. 124
Both Posner and Easterbrook also perceived an enormous practical
problem in the magistrate's order. As Judge Posner put it: ". . . since no
one officer of Oat may have had authority to settle the case, compliance
with the demand might have required Oat to ship its entire board of
directors to Madison."' 125 Judge Easterbrook noted that corporations
frequently use lawyers as negotiators. Accordingly, he argued, it is inap-
propriate to require a corporation to send an employee, rather than an-
other agent-here a lawyer who served the corporation only part-time.
Most corporations reserve the power to agree to senior managers or to
the board of directors, especially with claims of this size ($4 million). It
was understandable here that Oat wanted its managers to conduct its
business.
Fitzpatrick was deemed inadequate only because he was under instruc-
tions not to pay money.... On learning that Fitzpatrick did not command
Oat's treasury, the magistrate ejected him from the conference and never
listened to what he had to say on Oat's behalf, never learned whether Fitz-
patrick might be receptive to others' proposals. (We know that Oat ulti-
mately did settle the case, after it took part and 'prevailed' in a summary
jury trial-participation and payment each demonstrating Oat's willingness
to consider settlement). The magistrate's approach implies that if the chair-
man and CEO of Oat had arrived with instructions from the board to settle
the case without paying cash, and to negotiate and bring back for the
board's consideration any financial proposals, Oat still would have been in
contempt...
Fitzpatrick came in with power to discuss and recommend; he could set-
tle the case on terms other than cash; he lacked only power to sign a check.
The magistrate's order, therefore, must have required either (a) changing
124. Id. at 658 (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Easterbrook betrayed the same underlying as-
sumption. Id. at 665 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
Posner apparently thought Oat's indication, through its representative, that it was not prepared to
make any offer of payment clearly demonstrated the futility of the settlement conference. He seemed
unaware that litigants frequently state positions more firmly than they actually hold them. Posner
also seemed oblivious to the possibility that the parties might learn something at the settlement
conference that would cause them to change their positions.
125. Id. at 658.
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the allocation of responsibility within the corporation, or (b) sending a quo-
rum of Oat's board. 126
My mission in the foregoing discussion was not to explain why the
majority and dissenting judges had such different expectations about
what would happen in the settlement conference. Rather I merely in-
tended to show the correspondence between the judges' assumptions
about the characteristics of the settlement conference and their conclu-
sions about the case. I cannot help noting, however, that all of the judges
who had previously served as federal district judges voted with the
majority. 127
II. THE REPRESENTED CLIENT IN THE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE
All the opinions in Heileman agree that it is inappropriate for a federal
judge to coerce a litigant to settle. Accordingly, they also agree that a
federal judge should not order a represented client to attend a settlement
conference where such an order would tend to force the litigant to settle
in order to avoid the burdens of attendance. Yet the opinions say little
about when and for what purposes a judge should order such a client or
representative to attend a settlement conference. Moreover, they skip
lightly and inconsistently across the most perplexing questions the case
raises: what position, if any, must the representative of a corporation
hold? And what constitutes "full authority to settle the case?"
This Part addresses these issues. Section A describes the advantages
and disadvantages of client participation in settlement conferences. Sec-
126. Id. at 664 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Easterbrook also highlighted a related problem: the
limitations on settlement authority of the federal government. Id. at 665.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow has suggested that the Easterbrook and Posner dissents were grounded in
their interest in promoting efficiency for both courts and litigants. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing
Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR" 19 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1991).
Easterbrook's conclusion that the magistrate "ejected" Fitzpatrick is inconsistent with attorney
John Possi's recollection. Possi explained that after the initial meeting of the representatives, the
magistrate met privately with representatives of each group. Rather than "ejecting" Fitzpatrick and
Possi, the magistrate simply did not meet with them again. Telephone interview with John Possi
(Apr. 19, 1989).
127. Judges Kanne, Bauer, Wood, and Flaum. 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
(1989). I am indebted to Richard Florsheim, Esq., of Foley and Lardner, Milwaukee, for mention-
ing this to me and suggesting that an underlying motive might have been to support the trial judge.
Telephone Interview with Richard Florsheim (Apr. 18, 1989). Only one of the dissenters-Judge
Coffey-had served as a judge before his appointment to the Seventh Circuit. He served on the
Milwaukee County Civil, Municipal, and Circuit Courts and the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 2 AL-
MANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (7th Circuit) 18 (1989).
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tion B considers when and why a court should compel a represented cli-
ent or a representative of an organizational litigant armed with full
settlement authority to attend a settlement conference. Finally, Section
C considers the nature of the "full settlement authority" that such a spe-
cial representative should have.
A. Advantages and Disadvantages of Client Attendance in Settlement
Conferences
A client's attendance at a settlement conference can take numerous
forms. The following continuum describes one aspect of such
involvement:
-Client is available by telephone.
-Client waits outside the conference room.
-Client waits outside the conference room part of the time and sits in on the
conference part of the time.128
-Client sits in on the conference but does not speak, except perhaps to his
lawyer.
-Client sits in on the conference and speaks in response to questions from
his lawyer or in response to questions from the other lawyer or judge.
-Client sits in on the conference and speaks and asks questions relatively
freely.
-Client takes lead in speaking; consults lawyer as needed.
-Client and lawyer meet privately with judge.129
-Client meets with judge without lawyers.' 30
-Client meets privately with other client, without lawyers.13 1
Add to these variables differences in attorney-client, client-client, and
judge-attorney relationships, differences in the nature of the case, in the
type of negotiation conducted, and in the judicial host's interventions,
and you have an inkling of the complexity of the idea of client involve-
ment in a settlement conference. Lawyers, judges, and commentators
tend to argue about the advantages and disadvantages of client involve-
128. U. S. Magistrate Wayne Brazil, for instance, often requires the attendance of a client or a
client representative, but typically does not allow such persons actually to sit in on many of the
sessions. Although he begins and ends with group meetings, most of his work is conducted in sepa-
rate private caucuses with lawyers for each party. BRAZIL, supra note 75, at 239.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 521.
131. Although not common in settlement conferences, this is a standard feature of the minitrial.
John H. Wilkinson, A Primer on Minitrials, in DONOVAN, LEISURE, NEWTON & IRVINE ADR
PRACTICE BOOK 171, 179 (John H. Wilkinson ed., 1990).
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ment based largely upon unarticulated assumptions about some of these
variables.
L "Client-Centered" Arguments
One area of debate concerns the effect of the client's participation on
the client's own interests. For each potential advantage trumpeted, a
corresponding risk or potential disadvantage waits to be sounded:
-The client's presence increases the likelihood that her lawyer will be well
prepared. 132 [But: the client's presence may incline some lawyers to pos-
ture, to "show off.' 1 3 3 In addition, the client may become a great bother,
interfering with the lawyer's ability to accomplish her or his work.}
-The client's presence can reduce the risk that interests of the lawyer will
prevail over those of the client. For instance, a lawyer might recommend
for or against a particular settlement because of the lawyer's own financial
or professional needs, which could be related to excessive pressure from the
judge.134 [But: the client's presence may remove tactical advantages. For
example, often a lawyer will falsely attribute a stubbornness to the client to
give the lawyer negotiating strength. 135 In addition, it may be strategically
useful to delay consideration of an offer from the other side; this is easier to
do with an absent client. I
-The client may be better able to appreciate the value of alternate dispute
resolution processes if he hears about them directly from a settlement judge,
rather than from his lawyer, who might be unfamiliar with or biased against
such processes. 136 [But: the client may too readily succumb to the allure
132. ROSENTHAL, supra note 48, at 57. Rosenthal concluded that plaintiffs in personal injury
cases who participated with their lawyers in the preparation, negotiation, or trial of their cases recov-
ered more money. This is because the client's involvement kept the lawyer honest and alert, and
because the client could actually help the lawyer gather, organize, and present information.
133. BRAZIL, supra note 75, at 468.
134. Professor Peter Schuck, expressing a fear of judicial overreaching, notes that:
[T]he only people in a position to identify and appraise [judicial overreaching]-the law-
yers who interact with the settlement judge--cannot always be counted on to blow the
whistle. For example, the lawyer may have a personal financial or professional stake in a
settlement that the client, if fully informed, would reject. The lawyer may not be suffi-
ciently strong or independent to resist an oppressive judge bent upon settlement.
Schuck, supra note 70, at 363-64.
135. This is a variation of the well-known "good cop-bad cop" routine. Jeffrey Z. Rubin &
Frank E.A. Sander, When Should We Use Agents? Direct vs. Representative Negotiation, 4 NEGOTI-
ATION J. 395, 398 (1988).
136. SINGER, supra note 71, at 176-77 (discussing lawyers' resistance to alternative dispute reso-
lution). See generally, Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward
Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for Failure to Allow the Client to Control Negotiation and Pur-
sue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819 (1990). Of course, the judge also may
be unfamiliar with or biased against such processes.
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of a "quick fix," thereby giving up the chance of a better result through
trial. In addition, the other side may perceive as weakness the client's ex-
pression of willingness to try an alternative process. ]
-The client could gain respect for the judicial process.137 [But: if the client
is exposed to the realities of settlement conferences he could lose respect for
the process and for the impartiality of the judge.] 138
-The client will feel he has had a chance to tell his story, in his own
words, 139 by participating in a settlement conference. (But: to the extent
that such a feeling makes it easier for the client to settle, he loses his real
day in court. 140
-The client can learn much about the strengths and weaknesses of both
sides of the case by observing the conduct of the other parties, the lawyers,
and the judge;141 this can soften his attitudes or positions. [But: exposure
to the other side's behavior will anger or harden some clients, making set-
tlement more difficult.)
-If the client actually observes the exchange of monetary offers, he can bet-
ter assess the strength of the other side's commitment to a position; he may
notice things the lawyer misses. Although there may be some lawyers who
can fully appreciate and convey the nuances of a settlement negotiation,
many are vulnerable to misreading, to oversimplifying, and to embracing
too warmly the virtues of their own side's case. 142 [But: the client may
misinterpret the events and affect the lawyer's judgment in an erroneous
direction or become more difficult to "control."] 143
-The client's presence permits more rounds of offers and counter-offers. It
permits him to act on new information and allows cooperation and momen-
tum to build. 144 In addition, attendance requires the client to pay atten-
tion to the case, which, in itself, makes settlement more likely. IBut: the
client may lose his resolve because of the "crucible effect."] 145
137. See Lind, supra note 21, at 341.
138. Helleman III, 871 F.2d at 662 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
139. See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 46, at 179.
140. This may deprive both the individual and the courts of an opportunity to establish or clarify
public policy. See Fiss, supra note 73, at 1082-90.
141. Cf. BRAZIL, supra note 75, at 476.
142. See DEAN PRUITr, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 41-45 (1981); Rubin & Sander, supra note
135, at 397.
143. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
144. See ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 3-27 (1984); BRAZIL,
supra note 75, at 266.
145. U.S. Magistrate Wayne Brazil explains that
[Judicially hosted settlement conferences ... can have a "crucible effect," creating pres-
sures and generating an energy that makes litigants more malleable than they would be in a
setting outside the courthouse. To take advantage of such fleeting "moments of malleabil-
ity," you must have ready access to your client, and you must have prepared her so well
[Vol. 69:1059
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-The client can clear up miscommunications about facts and interests be-
tween lawyers. IBut: the client may be too emotionally involved to see the
facts clearly.) 146
-Direct communication between clients can lead to better understanding of
each other or of the events that transpired, perhaps even allow a healing of
the rift between them. 147 {But: direct communication may cause a flare-up
and loss of objectivity. Parties may harden their resolve. I
-The client, because he is more familiar with his situation, may be more able
to spot opportunities for problem-solving solutions, which could lead to
quicker and more satisfying agreements. 141 [But: the client may give away
information about his underlying interests that could leave him vulnerable
that she is equipped to make sound decisions about offers or demands with only a few
minutes notice.
In some cases counsel may view the "crucible" effect of the judicially hosted settlement
conference as a threat rather than as an opportunity. They may fear that the result of
increased client malleability will be a hastily entered bad deal. There is some risk, espe-
cially with judges who are known to press hard for settlements, that in the heat of the
closing moments of a conference you and your client might agree to terms that in a cooler
setting you would not accept. The way to minimize that risk is by knowing that it exists,
preparing well for the conference, and asking to take a break before responding to a final
offer (to permit you to discuss the proposal with your client in a less pressured setting).
BRAZIL, supra note 75, at 212-13.
146. Rubin & Sander, supra note 135, at 399 ("With just the lawyers present, there may be less
direct factual information, but concomitantly more candor about delicate topics.").
147. Professor Bush has stressed the public value of such an educational function. Bush, Dispute
Resolution and Ideology, supra note 71. See also Leonard L. Riskin, The Special Place of Mediation
in Alternative Dispute Processing, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 19, 26-27 (1985); Hank de Zutter, Proponents
Say ADR Spells Relief, ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 1988, at 1.
148. Cf. BRAZIL, supra note 75, at 501-03; Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury
Trial: Guidelines for Ensuring Fair and Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1086 (1990).
John Martin, Settlement Director for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, gave these
examples:
In [a] fraud case involving two medical professionals, when a traditional legal analysis
failed to close the impasse, the clients, who together had expended more in legal fees than
the judgment itself, responded to the suggested certainty that legal costs would continue
(an appeal and possible remand). They then agreed to [a] higher figure but a partial de-
ferred payment plan, with one client meeting the objection of the other to commercial
financing by suggesting a chattel mortgage on the other's office equipment. In another case
a manufacturer's representative offered to pay a significant portion of a judgment for
breach of warranty by supplying improved replacement products, thus achieving an addi-
tional savings represented by a profit margin of about 20%. It was particularly helpful in a
slack economy to keep its ,ork force intact. Similarly an insurance company self funded a
personal injury structured settlement which resulted in substantial savings represented by
the difference between its profit margin and the market interest rate used by annuity under-
writers.
As was true in these cases it is more likely that imaginative solutions will emanate from
clients rather then their lawyers who are often naturally engaged in an adversarial and
argumentative posture. Sometimes the subject matter of settlement discussion is so compli-
cated only the clients can readily understand it.
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to exploitation. 149 Moreover, the client will not be sufficiently objective. A
lawyer knowledgeable about the client's situation might do a better job of
developing problem-solving solutions. I
-Because the client's presence increases the likelihood of a settlement,150
and a settlement that will be satisfactory to the client, participation likely
will result in a savings of time and money for the client. [But: if some of
the risks described above materialize, his presence will have caused him to
lose time and money.]
-The client would not consider an order to attend a settlement conference as
coercive, but rather as an opportunity to participate. [But: the client might
react negatively to the coercive nature of the order and be uncooperative.)
These arguments bear two important implications. First, the asser-
tions of both risk and benefit gain strength as the client's actual participa-
tion increases. Thus, the client who not only observes the settlement
conference, but also talks, may enhance his or her opportunities for de-
veloping a problem-solving solution, while simultaneously increasing his
or her risks of being exploited, of angering the opponent, or of revealing
potentially damaging information. Clearly, this was the situation in the
personal injury claim mediation described in the beginning of this Arti-
cle; the session could have ended explosively at any moment. However,
in the police brutality claim mediation, also described in the beginning of
this Article, if both the plaintiff and a member of the police department
had been present, opportunities would have arisen to discuss more than a
financial settlement based upon the probable outcome in court. The cli-
ents could have focused on exactly what happened, and on how and why,
and looked toward changing police practices. There might even have
Letter from John H. Martin, Settlement Director, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, to the
Author 4 (Feb. 17, 1990) (on file with the author).
Sometimes the problem solving can extend to developing future relations.
In a million dollar collection case involving two corporations, the CEOs for both parties
were present. An ironic change occurred after the respective teams of lawyers engaged in
an extremely argumentative discussion, representing in my view, a vicarious catharsis. The
CEOs decided to meet alone (excluding the mediator as well as the lawyers) and negotiated
a settlement figure which enabled a mutually profitable business relationship to resume and
assistance to be rendered the judgment creditor in a major litigation elsewhere.
Id. at 5.
149. See supra text accompanying note 67.
150. Th[e] listing [of cases in which the clients' presence increased chances of settlement]
could continue indefinitely. In the several hundred cases I've handled for the Eighth Cir-
cuit, I always suggest the presence of the clients in a conference because it enhances the
prospects of settlement dramatically. I can think of no case where it was a detriment.
Martin letter, supra note 148, at 5. See also Wendy Faulkes, Pursuing the Best Ends by the Best
Means, 59 AUSTL. L.J. 457, 458 (1985) (effectiveness of mediation reduced when parties represented
by an agent).
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been a place for an apology. 1' On the other hand, the plaintiff might
have revealed damaging information or succumbed to the apology and
therefore reduced his demand.1 52
Second, all the arguments in favor of including the client presume that
the client is a competent, reasonably intelligent person with good judg-
ment who will not be pushed into making an agreement. Conversely, the
arguments against including the client assume he lacks one or more of
these qualities, and that the client's lawyer has them. In other words, the
arguments against inclusion of clients are more consistent with Model I
perspectives: a traditional lawyer-client relationship, adversarial negotia-
tion, and coercive intervention by the judicial host. The pro-inclusion
arguments are generally consistent with the assumptions that undergird
the Model II perspectives: a participatory lawyer-client relationship,
problem-solving negotiation, and facilitative intervention by the judicial
host.
2. Lawyers' and Judges' Perspectives
Although most lawyers apparently believe that the client's presence
enhances the prospects for settlement,153 many judges and lawyers are
inclined to exclude clients from active participation in settlement confer-
ences.154 This inclination is anchored in large part on Model I assump-
tions: traditional lawyer-client relations and adversarial negotiations
under a judge's heavy thumb.'55 These assumptions gain strength from
the "lawyer's standard philosophical map"' 56 and induce many lawyers
and judges to credit the arguments against including clients. Thus, a
lawyer may have a reflexive aversion to direct contact between clients
because he fears the client may make a damaging disclosure.'57 In turn,
151. See RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 202-204; Stephen B. Goldberg et al., Saying
You're Sorry, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 221 (1987).
152. For a discussion of the possibilities for problem-solving negotiation in the Heileman case,
see infra note 185 and accompanying text.
153. WAYNE D. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SUITS: LrIGATORS' VIEWS ABOUT APPROPRIATE
ROLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES 102-05 (1985).
154. See BRAZIL, supra note 75, at 522-29; supra note 21.
155. This should not be surprising because mediation tends to take on the characteristics of the
process it replaces. Kolb, supra note 73, at 59. In this sense, the judicial settlement conference takes
the place of a trial, which is adversarial, representational, and hierarchial, with both sides seeking the
coercive power of the judge. See Keating & Shaw, supra note 73, at 219-20.
156. Riskin, supra note 62, at 43-48, 57-59.
157. Federal Rule of Evidence 408 provides some protection.
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this fear may impair the lawyer's ability to imagine opportunities for cre-
ative problem solving.
Other, more subtle factors also may incline both lawyers and judges
toward excluding clients. The client's presence threatens customary,
hierarchial professional practices. It creates a risk, for instance, that the
judge's comments could embarrass the lawyer, a risk that could restrict
the judge's perception of his freedom to speak with counsel.158 It also
appears to threaten the lawyer-client relationship.'5 9 Both lawyer and
judge may wish to save the time required to explain to the client what is
going on. Lawyers also may resent the loss of certain negotiating tech-
niques, such as the "good-cop/bad-cop" routine.1"
On the other hand, good lawyers and wise settlement judges do not
approach settlement discussions woodenly. Many will recognize particu-
lar circumstances in which client involvement, even if contrary to their
general predilections, is appropriate. This may occur, for example, when
the lawyer encounters "client control problems" or when he recognizes
that unique characteristics of the case or the client make the client's pres-
ence essential.1 61
In addition, the psychological needs of lawyers and judges may be fac-
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering
or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to com-
promise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to
prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or state-
ments made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not
require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented
in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when
the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness,
negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investi-
gation or prosecution.
FED. R. EvID. 408. In addition, settlement conference orders frequently provide more extensive
blanket protection against using any information revealed in the settlement conference in a subse-
quent trial. See, eg., Settlement Conference Order (Form) (N.D. Okla Aug. 3, 1989) ("Neither the
settlement conference statements nor communication of any kind occurring during the settlement
conference can be used by any party with regard to any aspect of the litigation or trial of the case.").
Still, there are risks. For example, a client could reveal information that could lead to other
discoverable evidence or that would reveal the client's bottom line for settlement purpose. In addi-
tion, a settlement judge who will not try the case might inadvertently reveal confidential information
to the trial judge.
158. BRAziL, supra note 75, at 469.
159. Cf. id. at 475.
160. Rubin & Sander, supra note 135, at 398.
161. BRAZIL, supra note 75, at 468-69. The frequency of discussions of "client control"
problems in Brazil's book (id. at 127-30, 209-211, 226, 239-40, 245, 417, 429-32, 468-69, 528) sug-
gests that he regularly confronts traditional lawyer-client relationships.
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tors in the decision to exclude clients or to suggest, directly or indirectly,
that the clients not participate. Take, for example, the personal injury
insurance claim mediation described in the beginning of this Article.
The clients' presence impaired my ability as mediator to predict and con-
trol events.' 62 That made me anxious. It called into question my own
professional expertise, and, I imagine, that of both of the lawyers. In the
mediation of the police brutality claim, at which only professionals were
present, we could define the problem simply: finding a settlement agree-
ment acceptable to the clients. The session included only matters that we
could handle, in our professional roles, better than could the clients: ar-
guments and discussions about law and fact and predictions about how a
judge or jury would behave. The emotional relationship between the par-
ties, which resides in a sphere typically beyond the lawyer's expertise, did
not seem important.
Many settlement conferences are sufficiently similar to this kind of
nonjudicial mediation that lawyers and judges in those conferences often
will have experiences resembling those that the lawyers and I encoun-
tered. A lawyer who embraces a Model I vision of professional-client
relations may be unsettled by the participation or mere presence of a
client in a settlement conference. The lawyer who wants to maintain the
mystique of expertise could feel severely threatened by the presence of a
client. The client might interpret his uncertainty as incompetence, or,
worse, notice that he is unprepared, that the other lawyer is more clever,
or that the judge seems not to respect his opinion. Similarly, some judges
might feel discomfort about interfering with lawyer-client relations or the
possibility of being challenged, questioned, or evaluated by a client who,
not being legally trained, might behave less predictably than the lawyer.
In short, the presence of clients may breed anxiety and interfere with the
lawyers' and judge's feelings of competence and control. This anxiety
may cause an unspoken and, perhaps, unconscious conspiracy between
lawyers and judges to exclude clients from all or important parts of set-
tlement conferences.
B. When Should a Judge Mandate or Otherwise Encourage a
Represented Client to Attend a Settlement Conference?
To the extent that a client's attendance at a settlement conference is
162. Of course, the lawyers or I could have sharply limited the amount and nature of client
participation.
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likely to be useful to the client, it is more appropriate, and less likely to
be an abuse of discretion, for a judicial host to compel such attendance.
To the extent that the settlement conference provides for client participa-
tion (as opposed to mere attendance) the client's attendance more likely
will benefit the client.1 63 Additionally, a client more likely will partici-
pate in a settlement conference that includes Model II features, such as
participatory lawyer-client relationships, problem-solving negotiation,
and judicial interventions emphasizing facilitation rather than pressure.
Conversely, the client is less likely to participate when the conference is
dominated by Model I features, such as traditional lawyer-client relations
and adversarial bargaining under threats or pressure from the judicial
host.
Many of the potential benefits of client involvement, however, are
available even in Model I settlement conferences. Even in a conference
in which clients observe but do not speak, in which lawyers dominate,
and in which the host attempts to pressure a settlement, the client may
feel he benefits from observing both sides' lawyers in action. Such obser-
vation may improve his understanding of his legal position. It also may
soften his impression of the other side, which could lead to righting the
balance between them, to a psychological healing, and perhaps to a final
settlement."' In addition, the client's "presence," even in the hallway,
permits more rounds of offers.
For these reasons, and for a few listed below, I propose that a judicial
host should:
1. routinely require attendance of represented clients, 165 and repre-
sentatives of organizational clients with full settlement authority, in the
absence of a suitable, 166 and suitably presented objection; and
163. Except, of course, if the client falls victim to any of the dangers described in the preceding
section.
164. See supra notes 132-52 and accompanying text.
165. Cf. SPIDR Report, supra note 71 ("The parties should normally be allowed to attend and
participate [in mandatory dispute resolution processes]").
Specific situations-e.g., when the host believes that the client's lawyer does not understand the
case well or that, for some other reason, the lawyer will not convey accurately an offer from the
other side-may necessitate that the judicial host undertake additional measures.
A number of strategies are available to deal with such situations. The first is to have a private
caucus with the lawyer and client and ask the lawyer to explain the proposal to the client in the
judge's presence. The second is to have a group meeting and ask the opposing counsel to explain the
proposal in front of the assembled group. The third is to require a written proposal and response.
BRAZIL, supra note 75, at 244.
166. Grounds for objection should, of course, include circumstances that would make the cli-
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2. take appropriate measures to ensure that the client's presence is
worthwhile to the client.
167
Requiring attendance should be the routine practice because a judge
often may have difficulty anticipating what kinds of negotiation are possi-
ble. In addition, in my judgment, the potential advantages of client in-
volvement usually outweigh the disadvantages, even under Model I
conditions, and the judicial host, along with the lawyers and clients, can
adjust the nature and timing of the client's participation to maximize the
potential benefits and limit the risks. 16 ' To limit risks, for instance, the
lawyer for an overwrought client can keep him out of parts of the confer-
ence, and at other times can caution him against speaking or can ask him
leading questions.'69
The obligation to try to make the client's participation worthwhile for
the client has two components. First, the judge should encourage (but
not insist upon) actual participation by the client. The judicial host
should be wary of wasting the client's time in order to foster judicial
efficiency.170 Thus, the host should not summon the client to conference
ent's attendance unduly burdensome or that would pressure the client to settle rather than attend the
conference. They also should include arguments that the client's personality or situation would
make his presence detrimental. At all times, however, the judicial host must be wary of unthinkingly
giving in to excuses lawyers proffer based on unexamined Model I assumptions.
167. This is generally consistent with a major recommendation of the SPIDR committee report:
Mandating participation in non-binding dispute resolution processes often is appropri-
ate. However, compulsory programs should be carefully designed to reflect a variety of
important concerns. These concerns include the monetary and emotional costs for the
parties, as well as the interests of the parties in achieving results that suit their needs and
will last; the justice system's ability to deliver results that do not harm the interests of
those groups that have historically operated at a disadvantage in this society; the need to
have courts that function efficiently and effectively; the importance of the public's trust in
the justice system; the interests of non-parties whose lives are affected and sometimes dis-
rupted by litigation; the importance of the courts' development of legal precedent; and the
general interest in maximizing party choice. In weighing these valid and sometimes com-
peting concerns, policy makers should be cautious not to give undue emphasis to the desire
to facilitate the efficient administration of court business and thereby subordinate other
interests. Participation should be mandated only when the compulsory program is more
likely to serve these broad interests of the parties, the justice system, and the public than
would procedures that would be used absent mandatory dispute resolution.
SPIDR Report, supra note 71, at 11.
Limitations on judges' time can make investigation of clients' underlying interests seem infeasible.
BRAZIL, supra note 75, at 48. Cf. id. at 53. However, such explorations often will lead to quicker,
more satisfying settlements. See supra notes 132-52 and accompanying text.
168. Cf. BRAZIL, supra note 75, at 467-501; but cf. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 126, at 21-22
(emphasizing that routinely requiring attendance of clients would be inefficient for clients).
169. If the client is an organization, it may have several representatives from whom to chose.
The lawyer often could influence that decision in the direction of the most capable individual.
170. See SPIDR Report, supra note 71.
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and then keep him out in the hall without a very good reason.17 1 Second,
the judge should enhance the value of client participation by opening the
conference to a consideration of the parties' underlying interests. Of
course, the judicial host, along with the lawyers and clients, must decide
the extent to which the parties should discuss such matters in joint ses-
sions, and the parties should always have a right to refuse to discuss such
issues, even privately with the judge. But opposing lawyers and clients
often will be locked in an adversarial battle at the time of the settlement
conference. The host's goal should be to help them crack the adversarial
shell and to open the discussion to underlying interests in order to make
problem-solving negotiation possible-that is, if the parties have an inter-
est in doing so. 1
72
In addition, if appropriate, the judicial host can gently call into ques-
tion the lawyer's analysis of the case. He can ensure that the client is
actually present in joint sessions, not just in separate sessions. And he
can ensure that both sides consider the possibility of having the clients
talk directly with one another.
Another effective technique to foster client participation is to ensure
that the client understands the options to trial, including alternative
methods of dispute resolution. Often the clients can more easily learn
about such procedures directly from the judge rather than from their
lawyers.1 73 Thus, to the extent that the judicial host feels inclined to
intervene in the ways described above, he is more justified in compelling
the client to attend. 74
171. Magistrate Wayne Brazil describes situations in which clients were angered at being ex-
cluded from most of a settlement conference that they were required to attend. He attributes the
anger to his own failure to explain adequately his reasons for excluding the clients. BRAZIL, supra
note 75, at 489.
172. Id at 501-10. Of course the judicial host should not push too hard so as to overcome the
parties wish to continue with the litigation.
173. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
174. Cf. BRAZIL, supra note 75, at 489.
I recognize that to undertake such responsibilities, many judges will need additional training,
which I assume will be provided under the Civil Justice Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
650, § 103, 104 Stat. 5089, 5095 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 480), which requires the Federal
Judicial Center and the Administrative Office of the Courts to "develop and conduct comprehensive
education and training programs to ensure that all judicial officers... are thoroughly familiar with
the most recent available information and analyses about litigation management and other tech-
niques for reducing cost and expediting the resolution of civil litigation."
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C. A "Representative with Full Authority to Settle the Case"
The most confusing aspect of the magistrate's order in Heileman, and
the most crucial, concerned the attributes of the representative whose
presence it commanded. The order itself required each party to "be rep-
resented at the conference in person by a representative having full au-
thority to settle the case or to make decisions and grant authority to
counsel with respect to all matters that may be reasonably anticipated to
come before the conference." '75 In his opinion, Magistrate Groh wrote
that Oat's failure to send such a representative "could . . have been
excused if counsel had been given unrestricted settlement authority."
176
Judge Kanne, in the Seventh Circuit's majority opinion, wrote that "au-
thority to settle" meant that the "corporate representative .. was re-
quired to hold a position within the corporate entity allowing him to speak
definitively and to commit the corporation to a particular position in the
litigation."' 177 This led Judge Easterbrook to contend that the district
court inappropriately required the corporate litigant to send an em-
ployee, rather than another agent, such as a lawyer, 178 and that such an
order might have required the corporation to change its internal deci-
sionmaking structure, contrary to state corporate law.179 It also inspired
Judge Posner's notion that compliance with the order might have re-
quired the entire board of directors to attend. 80 I do not believe the
magistrate could reasonably have expected complete board attendance.
What could he have expected?
175. Heileman 1, 107 F.R.D. at 279.
176. Id. at 280.
177. Heileman 111, 871 F.2d at 653 (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 663 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 664.
180. Id. at 658 (Posner, J., dissenting).
A less stringent requirement appears in the standard form U.S. Magistrate John Wagner employs.
It provides: "If Board approval is required to authorize settlement, attendance of the entire board is
requested. The attendance of at least one sitting member of the board (preferably the Chairman) is
absolutely required." Mag. John Wagner, Settlement Conference Order (Form) (N.D. Okla. Aug. 3,
1989) (emphasis added).
U.S. Magistrate William A. Knox's form provides:
Lead trial counsel and persons with actual settlement authority for each party must be
present for the conference. A corporate or other nonperson party shall be represented by a
person with sufficient authority within the organization to participate meaningfully in a
discussion of settlement and to obligate the organization if a settlement is reached. In
addition, if an insurance company's approval or authority to settle is required by any party,
a representative of that insurance company shall attend this conference.
Mag. William A. Knox, Settlement Order (Form) (W.D. Mo. undated).
1991] 1109
1110 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 69:1059
The problem arose, of course, only because Oat was a corporation-a
juridical person. Had the litigant been an individual or a sole-proprietor-
ship, the magistrate could have ordered a specific individual to attend.
Such a person inherently would have "full settlement authority": the ca-
pacities to accept a settlement offer, to make proposals, and to learn from
the behavior of others in the settlement conference and thereby adjust his
position. In addition, he would have knowledge of his own interests and
situation that would enable him to partake in problem-solving negotia-
tion. But if the litigant is a corporation or other organization, locating
any one person with all these capacities may prove difficult.
What the magistrate legitimately could have wanted was the presence
of a representative whose attributes approached, as closely as feasible,
those of an individual litigant. We can understand these attributes by
referring to notions of authority, influence, knowledge, and discretion.
Thus, a representative with "full settlement authority" should have:
(1) The authority to commit the client to a particular course of con-
duct, such as paying or accepting a certain financial offer.1 81
(2) Sufficient knowledge-including an understanding of the client's
needs, interests, and operations-to see opportunities for interest-based or
problem-solving negotiation.
(3) Sufficient influence within the organization that his recommenda-
tions likely would affect the principal's decisions about settlement.
(4) Discretion and the wherewithal to negotiate a different kind of
arrangement, i.e., a combination of knowledge and influence that makes
it likely the decisionmakers will accept his proposal.
Although some corporations could send a person with all of these at-
181. The standard form Magistrate Wagner employs provides:
In addition to counsel who will try the case being present, a person with full settlement
authority must likewise be present for the conference. This requirement contemplates the
presence of your client or, if a corporate entity, an authorized representative of your client,
For a defendant, such representative must have final settlement authority to commit the
company to pay, in the representative's discretion, a settlement amount recommended by
the settlement judge up to the plaintiff's prayer (excluding punitive damage prayers in
excess of $100,000.00) or up to the plaintiff's last demand, whichever is lower. For a plain-
tiff, such representative must have final authority, in the representative's discretion, to au-
thorize dismissal of the case with prejudice, or to accept a settlement amount
recommended by the settlement judge down to the defendant's last offer. The purpose of
this requirement is to have representatives present who can settle the case during the
course of the conference without consulting a superior. A governmental entity may be
granted permission to proceed with a representative with limited authority upon proper
application pursuant Local Court Rule 17.1A.
Wagner, supra note 180 (emphasis added).
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tributes, t82 a representative with two or three of them ordinarily would
satisfy my notion of full settlement authority.18 3 In many cases, expect-
ing a corporation or government organization to provide an individual
representative with unlimited financial settlement authority will be un-
realistic. In such situations, a representative might be acceptable if he
had knowledge, discretion, and influence-even if he lacked authority to
settle at a specific dollar figure. Conversely, "full settlement authority"
sometimes would require more than mere authority to settle at a given
amount of money-unless, of course, the case settled within such author-
ity. To enhance the likelihood that the representative's participation
would be worthwhile, full settlement authority might also include addi-
tional elements of knowledge, discretion, or influence.
If Magistrate Groh had shared my vision of full settlement authority,
he might have explored Mr. Fitzpatrick's knowledge, discretion, and in-
fluence, rather than rebuking him for lack of authority to offer a financial
settlement. It seems likely, however, that, even by my standard, he
would have found that John Fitzpatrick lacked "full authority to settle
the case." First, Fitzpatrick lacked authority in the sense that he did not
have authority to make an agreement that called for Oat to pay
money. 1 4 Second, he apparently lacked discretion to commit to other
kinds of agreements. Fitzpatrick was a member of the law firm that usu-
ally represented Oat, not its attorney for all matters. He therefore may
have lacked the detailed knowledge of the corporation's situation and
182. See Keenan, supra note 14, at 1508.
183. Eighth Circuit Settlement Director John Martin puts it this way: "I want someone who
does not have to make a phone call, someone who knows what will fly." Telephone interview with
John Martin (Feb. 6, 1991).
Another interesting formulation was adopted by the Advisory Group appointed under the Civil
Justice Improvement Act of 1990 by the U. S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
That group developed an Early Assessment Program, the central feature of which is a conference at
which the parties discuss, among other things, alternative methods of resolving the case. Parties
normally are required to attend such sessions.
Where attendance of a party is required, a party other than a natural person satisfies the
attendance requirement if it is represented by a person or person, other than outside coun-
sel, with authority to enter into stipulations, with reasonable settlement authority, and
with sufficient stature in the organization to have direct access to those who make the
ultimate decision about settlement.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI, PROPOSED GENERAL ORDER,
EARLY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, EARLY IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT, See. IV.A. (Sept. 13, 1991)
(emphasis added).
184. I do not mean to suggest that Oat should have given him that authority, considering its
quite sensible and ultimately vindicated position that any payments should come from the insurance
company.
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interests that would have enabled him to spot opportunities for, and en-
gage in, problem solving negotiation. I find it difficult to speculate on
the influence he enjoyed.
Under my analysis, the exact position the special representative holds
would not be determinative. In most organizations, some high-level,
full-time executives are more likely to have capacity, knowledge, influ-
ence, and discretion than even an inside, full-time general counsel.
Sometimes, however, a general counsel can possess these attributes. So,
too, could an outside, part-time counsel.
What would have happened if both Oat and National sent representa-
tives endowed with the kind of "full settlement authority" described
above? The conference might have produced progress toward settlement,
even if National's representative asserted that the insurer was unwilling
to make an offer and was thinking about contesting coverage. This is
true for a number of reasons. First, Oat might have pressured National to
make an offer; at the least, it might have forced National to clarify its
position. Second, all the representatives might have garnered a better
understanding of their cases, which might have inclined them to settle.
Third, they might have explored problem-solving solutions'85 or alterna-
tive methods of resolving the dispute-such as a summary jury trial (the
procedure Judge Crabb imposed that ultimately led to a settlement). 186
It is impossible to predict what settlement options might have arisen if
persons with authority, discretion, influence, and knowledge had gathered
in an atmosphere that supported better understanding of each others'
positions or creative problem solving. That, probably, is what the magis-
trate sought.
D. The Obligations of the Represented Client in the Settlement
Conference
Once the client appears at a settlement conference, what are her obli-
gations? Rule 16(f) allows the imposition of sanctions "... if a party or a
party's attorney fails to participate in good faith." ' 7
185. These may not have been likely in this case. The prospect of insurance coverage, and Heile-
man's having already corrected the problems led all concerned to see this as a question of how much
money the insurance company would pay. On the other hand, the insurance company might con-
ceivably have agreed to a payment if Oat also agreed to provide some kind of service to Heileman,
perhaps at a discount.
186. Heileman II, 871 F.2d at 664 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
187. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(0. For a review of cases imposing sanctions under this rule, see Kath-
leen M. Dorr, Annotation, Imposition of Sanctions Under Rule 16(f), Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
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The most extreme position is that the parties must settle. This plainly
lacks foundation in the Federal Rules and is contrary to any sound think-
ing on the subject.' A related position would impose an obligation to
"bargain... in good faith," such as the duty that the National Labor
Relations Act fixes on unions and management. 8 9 This position also
lacks foundation."
At the other extreme is the notion that the client is obligated only to
attend.191 But this plainly would not satisfy the good faith participation
requirement in Rule 16(f).
Between these extremes, one federal district court requires that "It]he
parties, their representatives, and attorneys... be completely candid with
the mediator (or settlement judge) so that he may properly guide settle-
ment discussions." 192 This is an admirable exhortation, but often unreal-
dure, For Failing to Obey Scheduling or Pretrial Order, 90 A.L.R. FED. 157 (1988). Statutes and
court rules in other jurisdictions establish other requirements. SPIDR Report, supra note 71, at 8.
188. Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985).
189. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
190. Heileman III, 871 F.2d at 664 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). But see Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 126, at 21 (Judge Kanne's distinction between a requirement to attend and the require-
ment to settle "is not dissimilar from the requirements in labor law to bargain in good faith.").
The Supreme Court of Georgia found the very aroma of this notion frightening. In Department
of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 380 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. 1989), landowners were allowed to intervene to
set aside a takings declaration to build the "Presidential Parkway." The trial court ordered the
parties to participate in a mediation and to engage in discussions in "good faith." The Supreme
Court of Georgia shared Judge Manion's inability to distinguish between coercion into a settlement
conference and coercion in a settlement conference. See supra note 122. Suprisingly, the court
found that the language of the trial court order could be "construed to require the parties to mediate
their dispute on pain of contempt should they fail. That would amount to an order to settle the case
which requires power the court does not have, or an order to do a thing (mediate) which by its
nature must be voluntary." 380 S.E.2d at 268.
191. The Iowa Supreme Court apparently took this view in Graham v. Baker, 447 N.W.2d 397
(Iowa 1989). An Iowa statute requires a creditor who wishes to foreclose on farm property first to
"participate" in one mediation meeting and then to secure a "mediation release" signed either by the
borrower, or if the borrower refuses, by the mediator. The borrower's representative attended the
mediation, but his behavior "ranged between acrimony and truculency." Id. at 401. He did not
allow the borrower even to present its position and stated that his own position was not negotiable.
Both the borrowers and the mediator refused to sign the mediation release. The Iowa Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's issuance of a writ of mandamus. The trial court had ordered the
mediation service to sign the release, finding that there was no basis in the statute for the mediation
service to apply its own standards and that the conduct described above constituted satisfaction of
the "participation" requirement. The court emphasized that the statute intended mediation to create
an environment for settlement negotiation, not to force a settlement. Id.
192. United States District Court for the District of Kansas, Memorandum Order, in THE CPR
LEGAL PROGRAM, ADR AND THE COURTS: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 145-46 (Er-
ika S. Fine & Elizabeth S. Plapinger eds., 1987) (emphasis added).
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istic given the widely perceived need for adversarial strategies. Another
court has stated that it can require the representative of a party's insur-
ance carrier "to make reasonable efforts, including attending a settlement
conference with an open mind." 193 This obligation may be slightly more
onerous than Judge Kanne's idea that the representative "come to court
in order to consider the possibility of settlement."' 94 Both of these ap-
proximate my idea of the obligation of the special representative.
The word "attend" supplies the rest of the notion, for it can mean to
pay attention, which, in turn, can mean to engage in careful observation,
to heed, to notice. 95 In my view, the client should be obliged respect-
fully to consider, and reconsider, with the other parties or the judicial
host, the positions and the interests of both sides, and to think about
ways to resolve the dispute. The reader might argue that this is not the
sort of a duty that the law can enforce, and the reader would be correct.
If, however, we think of the order to attend as an invitation, to discuss as
much as debate, to converse as much as convince, to perceive as much as
persuade, we may see more settlements and more "justice" than we
expect. 196
III. CONCLUSION
One's attitude about whether a judge should compel a represented cli-
ent to attend a settlement conference depends importantly on what one
expects to happen at the conference. The practice of requiring or encour-
aging such attendance is likely to increase. It offers great opportunities
for more settlements, many of which would provide relatively high levels
193. Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44, 47 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
194. Heileman i1, 871 F.2d at 653.
195. See 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 548 (1933).
196. Professors McThenia and Shaffer explain a view of justice that could spring from direct
communication between clients:
Many advocates of ADR can well be taken to have asked about the law's response to
disputes, and alternatives to that response, not in order to reform the law but in order to
locate alternative views of what a dispute is. Such alternatives would likely advance or
assume understandings of justice (or, if you like, peace) that are radically different from
justice as something lawyers administer, or peace as the absence of violence. They assume
not that justice is something people get from the government but that it is something peo-
ple give to one another. These advocates seek an understanding of'justice in the way Socra-
tes and Thrasymachus did in the Republic: Justice is not the will of the stronger; it is not
efficiency in government; it is not the reduction of violence: Justice is what we discover-
you and I, Socrates said-when we walk together, listen together, and even love one an-
other, in our curiosity about what justice is and where justice comes from.
Andrew W. MeThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1665 (1985).
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of satisfaction for clients. Client involvement in settlement conferences,
however, also creates a risk that the client will be worse off for having
attended. Judges, lawyers, and clients, however, can adjust the nature of
the client's participation to minimize the risks and enhance the
opportunities.
Coercing a client to attend a settlement conference along with the law-
yer generally is more justifiable to the extent that the conference embod-
ies elements of what I have called Model II perspectives: participatory
lawyer-client relationships, problem-solving negotiation, and judicial in-
tervention designed to facilitate and educate. Yet client involvement can
have benefits even in a conference that is dominated by Model I features:
traditional lawyer-client relationships, adversarial negotiation, and a ju-
dicial host who emphasizes pressure and threats to encourage settlement.
Judicial hosts should routinely include clients in settlement confer-
ences. They also should attempt to make attendance worthwhile by en-
couraging significant participation by the clients and by opening the
conference to "nonlegal" considerations, such as the clients' underlying
interests. Judicial hosts should specify the nature of the full settlement
authority with which a client representative should be endowed. Full
settlement authority can be understood by reference to such notions as
authority, knowledge, influence and discretion. In some situations, au-
thority merely to settle at a particular figure may not suffice. The client
who attends a settlement conference is obligated respectfully to consider,
and reconsider, the rights and underlying interests of all litigants, rather
than simply to rely on adversarial positions.
Coercion into a settlement conference must be matched by a compen-
sating consideration for the needs of the client. Thus the client should
have the opportunity to participate, or to restrict her participation, and
also to learn about alternatives to the settlement conference, i.e., alterna-
tive methods of resolving the dispute.
This is not an easy assignment. It may require judges and lawyers to
alter familiar work habits and to question standard assumptions. Open-
ing settlement conferences to clients and to their underlying interests
challenges the conventional, hierarchical arrangements that typify Model
I relationships. It calls for judges and lawyers to share more of their
power with clients.197
197. There are many potential obstacles to this rethinking. SINGER, supra note 73, at 176; Ris-
kin, supra note 62, at 43-51.
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A judicial host justifiably can command the attendance of a repre-
sented client to the extent that the conference embodies Model II fea-
tures. Conversely, and perhaps more importantly, involving clients also
may be the best way to encourage the development of Model II features
in settlement conferences. In other words, a client's presence does not
merely call for Model II features, it also increases the likelihood of such
features. The client's presence, for example, makes possible more par-
ticipatory lawyer-client relationships and enables the negotiation to focus
more easily on underlying interests. In addition, it can act as a check on
the judge who otherwise would be more inclined to pressure the parties
than to facilitate their discussion. Thus, having the client in the settle-
ment conference can foster the development of Model II features. Such a
client can be a catalyst to make courts and lawyers more responsive to
the people they serve.
